RS

“The word conscience is best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.” Discuss (40)

/ vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

We use the word “conscience” every day, but rarely stop to think about what it really means.  In broad terms, it usually refers to our inner moral compass, yet it can also refer to the voice of God within us, reason, how we apply our moral principles, our moral framework or even the internalised voices of our parents within our subconscious mind. Because of this, and because the arguments of those who have attempted to define the conscience as a specific thing are not persuasive, it is best to understand conscience as an umbrella term for various factors in moral decision-making.

Firstly, in the Bible various different words are used to refer to and sometimes translated as conscience.  In the Old Testament, the Hebrew word “lev” for heart suggests that there is an inner moral guide.  For example, “David’s heart condemned him after he had numbered the people. So David said to the LORD “I have sinned greatly in what I have done…” 2 Samuel 24:10 It was not until the rabbinic period that the Hebrew word matzpun referred to conscience. Etymologically it means “hidden north”, giving the suggestion of an inner moral compass. In the New Testament the Greek word syneídēsis means the capacity to apply general principles of moral judgment to particular cases.  The word is used frequently by St Paul, for example in Romans Chapter 2 “when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them.” After the 4th Century AD the Greek word Synderesis / Synteresis started to be used in commentaries on both Old and New Testaments. The word synderesis is by most scholars reckoned to be a corruption of the Greek word syneidêsis (συνείδησις).  On the other hand, also in the New Testament, St Paul speaks of those whose consciences have become “seared with a hot iron,” 1 Timothy 4:2 meaning they no longer feel guilt for sin. Conversely, a “good” or “clear” conscience is seen as one that is aligned with God’s will (1 Timothy 1:5). In 1 Peter 3:16, Peter encourages Christians to maintain a clear conscience, so that they may stand firm in their faith and defend it with integrity when challenged. These references suggest that conscience is a distinct faculty that all human beings have.  Given that the Bible uses different words for conscience and implies that it is God’s law, an inner moral guide or compass, the capacity to apply general principles to specific cases, our moral character and a faculty which can be corrupted, it seems that the word conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

Secondly, following the Bible, different Christian scholars have used the word conscience to refer to different things. For example, Aquinas uses three different words to distinguish between three things people usually use the word conscience for; Ratio, Synderesis and Conscientia.  For Aquinas, the God-given and rational part of conscience is called RATIO, it commands us to pursue good and avoid evil and cannot be wrong. For Kant, this is reason itself, issuing us with Categorical Imperatives which we must choose to follow.  For St Augustine, Butler and Newman this is conscience as the “voice of God” speaking through our minds and calling us to do what is right, which they admit is not always the same as what is rational. For Aquinas also, the conscience is not a synonym for reason but also refers to a specific habit of reason that tries to work out what good and evil consist in. This practical part of reason (what Aristotle called Phronesis) is known as SYNDERESIS and it requires formation, moving from offering only the most general guidance towards being more and more specific.  While it is a duty to follow the guidance of synderesis, which is after all part of Ratio which cannot be wrong, because its guidance may be too general to be useful it might mislead us, such as leading us to pursue an apparent good and not a real good. In addition, for Aquinas, another part of conscience is CONSCIENTIA, the act of applying synderesis-guidance to specific situations.  This is what Fletcher refers to as conscience, defining it as a verb not a noun.  This shows that scholars use the word conscience to refer to the faculty of reason, the voice of God, the habit of practical reason and the act of applying moral rules to a specific situation… and that conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

Thirdly, psychologists have a variety of ideas about what the conscience consists in, that are independent of the Bible and based on scientific observations. While his methodology was criticised by Popper as pseudo-scientific, Freud saw conscience as part of the super-ego, part of the subconscious mind that represents internalised voices of our parents, societal norms, religious beliefs and moral ideals. Conscience is formed during early childhood, particularly through the oral, anal and phallic phases of psycho-sexual development, suggesting that while conscience is a specific part of the psyche, it is made up of the values of our parents or care-givers as influenced by repressed experiences in different ways, explaining why peoples’ consciences seem to guide them in different directions that are not always rational or consistent with prevailing social norms. Freud’s ideas influenced other psychologists, whose methodologies are more credible, again seeking to explain how consciences develop through childhood and differ between adults.  For Piaget, consciences develop from being heteronomous in early childhood to being autonomous during the teenage years, and developmental disorders therefore explain why some adults lack a moral conscience, why others have a strong sense of the conscience being like a moral compass pointing towards fixed rules and still others see it as a more flexible and situational process of decision-making.  Similarly, for Fromm conscience usually develops from being authoritarian into being more humanistic, but some people fail to develop leaving them with an authoritarian conscience into adulthood and conforming to rules imposed on them from outside without really engaging reason. This explains how totalitarian regimes sometimes succeed, and why there will always be those who oppose them on humanistic grounds.  Finally, Kohlberg built on the ideas of Piaget and Fromm to suggest that conscience continues to develop in adulthood for some, towards a post-conventional level which at Stage 6 involves the conscience being reason, applying universal moral rules. Kohlberg explains why some peoples’ consciences demand that they follow rational deontological ethics, while others suggest they should be more situational and relativistic in their decision-making while others still command them to conform with social norms. While Freud, Piaget, Fromm and Kohlberg suggest that there is a specific thing called the conscience, they stress how it develops and changes, giving guidance of different sorts.  They also have slightly different ideas of conscience from each other.  This also suggests that conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

In conclusion, the word conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making. From a Christian perspective, Friedrich Schleiermacher, a German theologian and philosopher, agreed with this, viewing conscience as an umbrella term that integrates various factors of moral self-awareness. From a social-scientific perspective Carol Gilligan (b.1936) in “A Different Voice” (1982) argued that conscience is an umbrella term that includes different moral orientations depending on one’s ethical approach (e.g., care ethics versus justice ethics). She suggested that the conscience is influenced by not just reasoning, but also empathy, relational dynamics, and the emotional ties that influence moral judgment.  Whether one is approaching conscience from a religious or non-religious perspective, seeing it as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making is the most credible approach.

Critically discuss different Christian interpretations of what heaven is like. [40]

/ vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

All Christians believe in heaven.  The belief is affirmed in the last line of the Nicene Creed “We believe also in… the resurrection of the dead, in the everlasting judgement of souls and bodies, in the Kingdom of Heaven and in the everlasting life.” Yet Christians have different interpretations of what heaven is like, ranging from belief that heaven is a place much like earth, but perfected and everlasting, through to belief that heaven is a spiritual state or even entirely symbolic. Overall, it is the first of these interpretations, that heaven is a perfected, eternal place, that is most consistent with Christian doctrine.

Firstly, the Roman Catholic Church affirms that while human beings have a soul and a body, these form a single human nature, and according to Catechism 366 “[the soul] will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection.” This suggests that our eternal life in heaven will be much like our life on earth, so that each person will have a soul and a body, but our life in heaven will be eternal and we will be with God, much as Adam and Eve were with God in Eden.  This view of heaven is consistent with Jesus’ teaching in the Gospels and with the fact that Jesus ascended into heaven, where he remains “at the right hand of the father”, which suggests that heaven is a place.  In the Parable of the Sheep and Goats in Matthew 25 Jesus describes a final judgement where people are judged and then sent off for an eternal life in heaven or eternal punishment in hell.  This confirms that there will be a final resurrection and judgement, as the Catechism says, and that heaven will be eternal life. Also, the Parable of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16 describes heaven being separated from hell by a chasm, with those in hell being able to see and call to those in heaven.  Again, this suggests that heaven and hell are eternal places, of reward and punishment respectively.  Nevertheless, it is true that the two parables give different impressions of when people will go to heaven.  The Parable of the Sheep and Goats suggests that there will be a final judgement, followed by eternal heaven or hell, whereas Dives and Lazarus suggests immediate judgement and entry into heaven and hell while life on earth continues.  Despite this, Roman Catholic teaching makes sense of this through its teaching about purgatory, whereby the soul separates from the body and is reclothed in a heavenly body for purification in purgatory, a temporary hell, the gates of which will then be opened at the final judgement so that souls can be released and reunited with their risen bodies for final judgement and eternal reward in heaven, as appropriate. While purgatory is not supported by clear Biblical evidence, the Church was given authority to “bind and loose” by Jesus in Matthew 16:19 so the authority of the Church to add to Biblical revelation such as regarding purgatory is consistent with the Bible. Further, purgatory makes sense of how sinners can still hope for eternal life given what Revelation 21:27 says about heaven namely that “nothing impure will ever enter it”, and how God’s goodness and justice are compatible.  It follows that the Roman Catholic view of heaven as a place is most consistent with the Bible and Christian doctrine. 

Secondly, the idea that heaven is a spiritual state has always been popular because there is no physical evidence supporting the belief in heaven as a place while heaven as a spiritual state would not require such evidence.  Belief in heaven as a spiritual state is also compatible with Platonic Dualism; heaven would be like the world outside the cave in Plato’s famous allegory, illuminated by the sun and filled with the “forms” of things we only encounter as shadowy particulars in the body. Naturally, St Augustine’s view of heaven was influenced by neo-Platonism; he spoke of heaven as the eternal contemplation of God in Confessions Book XII.  Patly because of St Augustine, Platonic Dualism dominated the Classical and then Medieval worldviews, with philosophers such as Descartes seeing the soul and heaven saw as purely spiritual, with death being a liberation from the mechanistic snares of the physical body. There is some Biblical support for the view that heaven is spiritual; for St Augustine and later for Descartes, the ultimate reward was to see God face to face and have a perfect understanding of reality, as was promised in 1 Corinthians 13:12 and also in 1 John 3:2.  This might explain why Pope John Paul II seemed to imply that heaven and hell are spiritual states more than places in some remarks he made in 1999.  He spoke most particularly of hell, describing it as the absence of God in a way that is consistent with 2 Thessalonians 1:9 “They will be punished with everlasting destruction and shut out from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might”.  But the Pope also said “Heaven “is neither an abstraction not a physical place in the clouds, but a living, personal relationship with the Holy Trinity. It is our meeting with the Father which takes place in the risen Christ through the communion of the Holy Spirit…” this seems to suggest that the Pope supported the view that heaven is a spiritual state and not a place, contradicting his own Catechism.  Yet this is a misunderstanding of the Pope’s meaning. The Catechism affirms that through the sacraments we participate in Christ, who is in heaven at the right hand of the father, so through the sacraments Catholics have a “living personal relationship with the Holy Trinity” in heaven while they are still alive, tasting the heavenly reward they will one day enter each time they partake of the sacraments.  The Pope in his remarks was telling Catholics to focus on what heaven is to them now rather than speculating about what it might be like in the future in a way that cannot be accurate.  After all, the “Kingdom of Heaven” – at least as it will be after the end of time and judgment – does not exist yet. Also, neither the Bible nor Pope John Paul II’s remarks exclude the view that the Kingdom of heaven will ultimately be a place.  It could be that people are shut out from God’s presence while in a place that is Hell, or that they see God face to face and know God as he is while in the place that is heaven, described in other Biblical references.  Seeing heaven as a spiritual place casts doubt on the numerous references which suggest that heaven is a place.   Further, if heaven is a spiritual state only, this suggests that only our soul goes to heaven.  This implies that “I” am my soul and that my body is less important, which might encourage me to denigrate the body and/or see its actions as less important than those of the soul, as Gnostic heretics did during the first centuries of Christianity, and as Cathar heretics later did.  Because of the practical implications of these heretical positions, such as for sexual ethics, the Roman Catholic Catechism 362-368 specifically rejects these ideas, affirming that the body and the soul are a unity and are both necessary for eternal life.  The Roman Catholic theology of the body is consistent both with the doctrine of the incarnation, which shows the importance of the human body in that God chose to become incarnate in one, and with St Paul’s teaching in 1 Corinthians 6:19-20 “Do you not know that your bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore, honour God with your bodies.” So, it follows that the idea that heaven is a spiritual state is less consistent with the Bible and Christian Doctrine than the idea that heaven is a place.

Thirdly, the idea that heaven is a symbol of a person’s spiritual and moral life on Earth and not either a place or a spiritual state has grown in popularity through the later 20th and early 21st Centuries amongst ordinary believers, seeking to reconcile their faith with a scientific worldview. Amongst philosophers, Paul Tillich is most often associated with the argument that words used to describe heaven are symbolic.  However, by Tillich’s understanding of symbolic language, this does not suggest that heaven is not a place or spiritual state, because for Tillich symbolic language is cognitive and symbolic words participate in the objective reality to which they refer.  For Tillich, just as God is not a thing but is the “ground of our being”, ‘immortality does not mean a continuation of eternal life after death, but it means a quality which transcends temporality’ (Tillich 1963: 410 [vol. 3]).  This suggests that it is mistaken to imagine that heaven is a place like earth, because it will be timeless as God is timeless.  Nevertheless, Tillich did not suggest that “heaven is a symbol of a person’s spiritual and moral life on earth and not either a place or spiritual state.”  This idea might instead be associated with anti-realism and the belief that religious language takes its meaning not from correspondence and reference but from coherence within a religious form of life.  By this view, when a believer speaks of heaven, they would not be referring to a specific place or state after death, but to their hope for reward in union with God more generally.  It is fair to say that this position is neither compatible with the Bible nor with mainstream Christian doctrine.  The Bible speaks of what is “True” and not of what is “true for us” and so does Christian doctrine. Also, it is difficult to find scholars who really accept this anti-realist position.  While John Hick had some unconventional views about the afterlife and went so far as to describe the incarnation as a metaphor, he never suggested that talk of heaven is only symbolic.  In his earlier writings he implied that heaven was a place, populated by people in replica heavenly bodies, while in his later writings he spoke of some form of re-incarnation, whereby the energy of one life is reused in and influences future lives.  Hick was not an anti-realist and neither did he see heaven as a symbol.  Some textbooks suggest that DZ Phillips is a good example of a Christian who saw heaven as a symbol and not as a place or a spiritual state, and yet Patrick Horn describes this as a “caricature” of Phillips position, and is supported by others including Mikel Burley, who reject the basic claim that Phillips is a non-realist. While Phillips did claim that much religious discourse is “not fact stating”, he did not mean that it is non-cognitive but rather that it refers not to the worldly reality in which there can be facts, but to a different kind of reality.  For Tillich, Hick and Phillips, as for many other Philosophers of Religion through history, God’s existence is not like our existence.  God does not exist in the way that a cat exists, but that does not mean to say that he does not exist either.  As Aquinas put it, there is no-thing that is God… but God is not nothing.  Extending this to heaven, if heaven exists it would not be a place quite like earth but that doesn’t mean that it is not a place, so Tillich, Hick and Phillips is right to point out that religious language about heaven is neither like ordinary language nor only an expression of our own beliefs and hopes. This shows that the view that heaven is only a symbol is not compatible with the Bible, with mainstream Christian doctrines or indeed, even with the philosophy of those claimed to share this view.

In conclusion, the Roman Catholic view of heaven as a place is most consistent with the Bible and Christian doctrine.  While the view that heaven is a spiritual state is supported by some Biblical references and by parts of Catholic doctrine, both in the Catechism and in Pope John Paul II’s 1999 remarks, the view that heaven is ONLY a spiritual state is not compatible with the Bible or Christian doctrine as a whole. It could be that heaven is a spiritual state AND a place therefore.  Further, while some Philosophers have explored the nature of language that refers to heaven and have shown that claims are not ordinary fact-stating claims, the view that heaven is only a symbol is not found in scholarly works, probably because it is not compatible with either the Bible or with Christian doctrine.

Assess the claim that love (agape) is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics. [40]

/ vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

In John Chapter 13 Jesus taught his disciples “A new command I give you: Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another.  By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another.”  The Greek word translated “love” in this passage is agape, which refers to the non-preferential humanitarian love that Jesus showed to people rather than the erotic eros or the friendly philos.  This is why some Christians regard agape-love as the only source of Christian ethics, because it was Jesus’ single new commandment and, of course, Jesus was God. Nevertheless, today few Christians agree with this, given that Roman Catholics follow heteronomous ethics and most Protestants a broader Divine Command ethic based on the whole Bible.  It follows that agape is not sufficient as the only source of Christian ethics.

Firstly, while John 13 does state that agape-love is the one commandment by which Christians will be known as Jesus’ disciples, Jesus said this in context.  In Jeremiah 31:33 God promised that “This is the covenant I will make with the people of Israel after that time,” declares the LORD. “I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts. I will be their God, and they will be my people.” This suggests that Jesus was referring to the new covenant when he gave the commandment of agape-love, and meaning that Christians would follow all God’s law automatically in both letter and spirit, rather than that they would abandon the rest of the commandments and do whatever they felt was loving instead.  This interpretation is consistent with Matthew 5:18 “For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished…” and with the rest of Jesus ethical teaching, which is more demanding than the Law of Moses and not less.  For example, in Matthew 5 teaches that Jesus equated anger with murder and lustful looks with adultery.  While Jesus was demanding that Christians should act with agape – treating others as they would wish to be treated and not only following the letter of the law – there is no sense that agape is an alternative source of ethics to the rest of God’s commandments.   The point is that a person acting with agape would neither be angry with somebody nor murder them, neither look lustfully at a woman nor commit adultery with her.  In this way it would be wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics.

Secondly, for Roman Catholics seeing agape-love as a sufficient basis for Christian Ethics ignores the importance of a well-formed conscience as well as of Scripture, Tradition and Reason (Natural Law) in shaping Christian teaching. Following St Thomas Aquinas’ reasoning, the Catechism affirms that the primary source of Christian ethics is the conscience.  When we face a difficult choice, it is a moral duty to follow conscience.  Our conscientia is that part of our practical reason that applies the general principles of Christian Ethics that we know through synderesis (principles which are consistent with Scripture, Tradition and Natural Law) to the specific situation at hand.  Nevertheless, because consciences can err, leading us to pursue apparent and not real goods, and because synderesis is a habit that needs to be developed, we must take care that consciences are properly formed through a Catholic education.  Church teachings, which underpin Catholic education, provide a short-cut to the decisions that a well-formed conscience would make and when the conscience diverges from Catholic teachings it is a good indication that the conscience is erring.  Pope Pius XII rejected situation ethics in 1952, even before its more agapeistic versions were developed by Joseph Fletcher and JAT Robinson, because while it is consistent with the Roman Catholic understanding of Christian ethics in encouraging Christians to act in conscience, because it ignores the need to form consciences or ensure that their decisions are consistent with Scripture, Tradition and Reason, it leaves individuals vulnerable and without proper moral guidance when they face difficult situations. Fletcher’s claim that there should be no absolutes in Christian ethics, no always and no nevers, conflicts with the Bible’s long list of prescriptive commandments and suggests that agape is instead of the law rather than a fulfilment of it, as Jesus taught.  It is also difficult to define agape-love.  For example, Immanuel Kant argued that human beings are “pathologically loving” and that an action motivated by this love always treat human beings as ends in themselves and never as mere means.  By contrast, Fletcher defends what he calls the agapeic calculus, the greatest amount of neighbour-welfare for the largest number of neighbours possible, making agapeistic ethics seem much like utilitarianism.  While by Kant’s definition, agape could never justify involuntary abortion, suicide or adultery… but Fletcher freely discusses situations in which these would, he implies, be the most loving course of action. Because of this central confusion, it is difficult for people not to confuse a genuinely agapeistic motivation with a more preferential or even selfish motivation. All this shows that it is wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics.

On the other hand, it is true that Jesus sometimes seemed to break the laws of Moses situationally, for the benefit of people. According to Mark’s Gospel, He healed on the Sabbath and allowed his disciples to pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, neither of which in life-threatening situations. It seems that Jesus was maximising peoples’ welfare and putting this ahead of obedience to the law, as Fletcher suggested.  Nevertheless, the laws concerning the Sabbath were, Jesus reasoned, there to serve man and therefore could and should be broken when they harm peoples’ welfare.  The same might not be true of other laws, such as the prohibition on murder in Exodus 20:13.  In Genesis 4 God says that Abel’s blood cries out to him from the ground and in Genesis 9 God demands an accounting for any human blood that is shed.  This might suggest that the law against murder is not only to serve humans, but also to serve God because God has an interest in human blood.  As St Paul confirms in 1 Corinthians 6:19-20 “Do you not know that your bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore honour God with your bodies.” Which implies that human life is sacred and owned by God, so murder offends against God and not only human beings.  If this is true, then it would be impossible to act out of agape-love and kill a human being, even in situations as extreme as outlined by Fletcher, because agape puts love of God first and ahead of love of neighbour, according to Mark 12:28-32. Kant would be right that agape always treats humanity as an end and never as a means to an end, even of maximising human welfare. This suggests that agape-love is not sufficient as a source of Christian ethics, unless one specifies that it includes love of God as well as and ahead of love of neighbour, which would bring following all of God’s commandments into the scope of agape, rather than accepting God’s laws only selectively. This interpretation would be consistent with a more mainstream Protestant Ethic, which aims to follow all those Divine Commands in spirit at least. 

In conclusion, it is wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethic unless one is very specific in defining agape, stipulating that it includes love of God as well as and ahead of love of neighbour, so leads to a broader biblical ethic which always upholds the sanctity of human life.  Certainly, it is wrong to say that situation ethics is the only or even an acceptable Christian Ethic.

In meta-ethics, the term “good” has an objective factual basis. Discuss [40]

/ vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

In meta-ethics, in the past most scholars have held that the term “good” has an objective factual basis. Moral realists include ethical monotheists, who see the term good referring to God and God’s commands, as well as ethical naturalists, who see the term good referring to some quality that can be observed, and ethical non-naturalists, who see the term good referring to a rational intuition. On the other hand, since the early part of the 20th Century moral non-realism has come to dominate.  For example, non-realists like AJ Ayer and JL Mackie argue that the term “good” has no objective factual basis because it does not refer to a verifiable point of reference but rather expresses subjective feelings and emotions.  Overall, today the claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis is not persuasive.

Firstly, ethical monotheists claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis in God and God’s commands.  The Bible claims that “only God is truly good” Mark 10:18 and this is supported by both Classical Theism and Theistic Personalism, which have in different ways established that God is the omnibenevolent creator and the source of goodness in human actions. Further, at least for Protestant Christians, faith is Sola Scriptura and the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide, which suggests that what is good depends on God’s commands, which can be checked against the Bible, objectively.  Nevertheless, ethical monotheism is not credible.  Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma shows that if God is the source of moral standards, as ethical monotheism suggests, then God cannot be good but is an arbitrary tyrant.  On the other hand, if in fact there are objective moral standards that God follows, he can be good but is not the origin of goodness as ethical monotheists suggest, and neither is He all-powerful.  Bertrand Russell found the Euthyphro Dilemma so persuasive that he used it as the basis for a disproof of God. Further, centuries of Church history demonstrate the problems with the ethical monotheist claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis, when Christians so rarely agree on what it is or involves. Biblical Criticism shows that God’s commandments are not clear from the Bible, existing in different sometimes contradictory lists, being obviously influenced by the contexts of the biblical authors and being wide open to interpretation.  For example, the ten commandments are detailed in Exodus 20 and Exodus 34 and again in Deuteronomy 5.  The versions are phrased and organized differently, and the order of the coveting commandments is different between Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5.  Further, Jesus said that the two greatest commandments were love God and love of neighbour in Mark 12 and also that love was the only commandment in John 13.  Which commandments should a Christian follow and with what priority?  Further, the Commandments have always been interpreted differently by different Christians.  For example, Catholics and Lutherans combine the first two commandments, “no other gods” and “no graven images” while other Protestant Christians separate the first two commandments, making “no graven images” a separate commandment and leading to radically different attitudes to art and architecture even within Protestantism.  These examples show how ethical monotheism and its claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis is not credible.

Secondly, ethical naturalists claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis which can be observed.  For example, the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham argued that “nature has placed mankind under two sovereign masters; the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain”, reasoning that “good” refers to actions which produce the maximum amount of pleasure, which can be observed and measured using the seven criteria of extent, duration, intensity, certainty, propinquity, purity and fecundity, as well as the minimum amount of pain.  However, ethical naturalism is undermined by the is-ought gap, which Hume explained thus “in every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it’s necessary that it should be observed and explained; and while a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”  Hume’s point was that we can observe nature and what is, but we can’t observe any basis for ought claims at all.  Ethical naturalism is based on assertion and not argument and has no observable factual basis for what it claims to be good. Further and despite being a moral realist and thinking that the term “good” has an objective factual basis, G.E Moore claimed that ethical naturalism relies on the “naturalistic fallacy”, the incorrect assumption that something is good because it occurs in nature or is considered normal in society.  For Moore, just because something is natural or normal does not make it good.  For example, misogyny and sexual violence have been endemic through history and still are across the world today… this does not make these good or right.  This shows that the claim that the term good has an objective factual basis cannot b supported through ethical naturalism either.

On the other hand, G.E Moore and other ethical non-naturalists have conceded that what is good depends neither on the commands of God nor on anything that can be observed in nature.  Instead, drawing on Plato, they have argued that we know what is good as a rational intuition.  This explains why people find some actions which go against laws and don’t maximise happiness are good… such as a soldier disobeying orders and getting himself killed while trying to save a comrade.  Nevertheless, ethical non-naturalism is no more persuasive a basis for the claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis than ethical monotheism or ethical naturalism.  The claim that we all know what goodness is as a rational intuition ignores the fact that people have widely different concepts of what is good.  Actions like that of the soldier are controversial… yes, some people would see him as a hero and say that his actions were “good” despite breaking the rules and compounding suffering… but many would reject this and argue that he should have obeyed orders and lived. Further, AJ Ayer was right to point out that claims about good, bad, right and wrong are better seen as expressions of subjective feelings and emotions, having no objective factual basis, than as having an objective basis in a rational intuition that we can’t observe or prove. Ayer’s argument develops that of Hume, that while we can observe what is, claims about what we ought to do are pure assertion and not verifiable.  Further, JL Mackie later agreed with Ayer, pointing out that ethical claims are based on an error and that moral judgments in fact “reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of life.”  Here Mackie was influenced by Wittgenstein, who had cast doubt on the ability of any term to have an “objective factual basis” arguing that meaning in language comes from usage and not reference so that it is not objective or factual. All these points suggest that ethical non-naturalism fails to provide any better defence of the claim that terms like “good” have an objective factual basis than ethical monotheism and ethical naturalism and that in fact ethical non-realism is more persuasive in its suggestion that terms like “good” have only a subjective basis.

In conclusion, the term “good” has no objective factual basis but is rather subjective and best understood as an expression of personal or communal feelings and emotions.  Today, ethical realism lacks credibility, so attention should be focused on refining ethical non-realism to provide the best possible explanation for how and why people use ethical language.

The five primary precepts are the most important part of natural law. Discuss [40]

/ vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

St Thomas Aquinas explained his theory of natural law, which shares many characteristics with other versions of natural law, in Summa 2i. 94.2.  He explained how natural laws are discoverable through RATIO, the human intellect, which is made up of SPECULATIVE REASON and PRACTICAL REASON.  Speculative reason reveals abstract notions and principles, such as “good is that which all things seek after,” then practical reason applies these to real life, developing moral precepts for us to follow.  For example, “this is the first precept of [natural] law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” Aquinas goes on to explain how “all other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.” He elaborated on the precepts of natural law, listing and explaining primary and secondary precepts, explaining how “Since… good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.” Primary precepts are thus established as “objects of pursuit” or prescriptions and secondary precepts as “objects of avoidance” or prohibitions.  For examples, “whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law…” meaning that the preservation of human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept. Aquinas also lists as primary precepts sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God and shunning ignorance as well as living in society, avoiding offending those amongst whom one must live.  Overall, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law.

    Firstly, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law because they are derived from the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided”, and different scholars have derived different lists of primary precepts, which have gone on to produce different lists of secondary precepts and disagreements in how natural law guides people in practical situations. Aquinas discussed whether or not his list of primary precepts was infallible in Summa 2i. 94. 2 and concluded that the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided” is infallible, because it is so closely related to the Primary Principle of speculative reason “good is that which all things seek after” and because speculative reason cannot be wrong, its objects being necessary truths.  Nevertheless, the primary precepts of the preservation of human life, sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God, shunning ignorance and living in society are known through synderesis, which must develop its understanding of these precepts as it is formed.  While nothing the synderesis suggests can be wrong, the list of primary precepts it provides might be incomplete, which explains why some societies seem unaware of some basic human goods.  Aquinas explains how it is possible to be unaware that living in society and avoiding offending neighbours is a primary precept, “thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).”  This would explain why later versions of natural law have listed the primary precepts differently, and particularly why some have added to Aquinas’ five.  For example, John Finnis lists seven basic human goods, including play and aesthetic experience.  This could be because Finnis’ synderesis has developed further than Aquinas’ did, coming to recognise the essential importance of fun and beauty to human flourishing in a way that Aquinas never did.  It follows that the fact that the list of five primary precepts provided by Aquinas, and indeed other lists in other versions of Natural Law, differ and might be incomplete suggests that they cannot be the most important part of natural law.

    Secondly, the primary precepts are general injunctions and need to be translated into secondary precepts in order to provide useful moral guidance. Whereas the primary precepts are positive, secondary precepts are negative and tell people what they must not do.  For example, preserve human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept.  Yet there are often multiple secondary precepts derived from each primary precept.  For example, the primary precept of living in society would lead to a huge number of secondary prohibitions, ranging from do not steal to do not lie to do not be jealous or aggressive… It follows that the majority of moral rules that people live by in practice are secondary and not primary precepts, suggesting that the secondary precepts are more important than the primary precepts.  Of course, secondary precepts are all derived from the primary precepts, so could not exist without the primary precepts and would differ if the primary precepts differed.  This might suggest that the primary precepts are more important than the secondary precepts, and yet for most people their moral awareness begins with the conscientia speaking against certain actions in a negative way, such as by warning people not to cheat or deceive.  Although it is true that the conscientia does this because it is seeking to apply the primary precepts to specific situations, in practice people are usually aware of the secondary precepts before or even without being aware of the primary precepts, which suggests that in fact the secondary precepts are more important.

    On the other hand, Proportionalists like Bernard Hoose would argue that the primary precepts of Natural Law are more important than the secondary precepts because there are sometimes proportional justifications for breaking secondary precepts, but never for breaking primary precepts.  For example, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to the secondary precept, don’t run inside… because running causes accidents and people might get hurt… but in the case of an explosion it might be proportionally justified to run, risking accidents, when this is the only way to save lives. Similarly, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to a secondary prohibition against abortion, but in the case of an ectopic pregnancy where inaction would lead to the death of both mother and child, it might be proportionally justified to abort in order to preserve the maximum number of human lives. Hoose points out that even Aquinas uses proportional reasoning to justify war, capital punishment and even the toleration of prostitution… so surely this suggests that primary precepts are more important than secondary precepts, given that secondary precepts can be broken in the pursuit of good, but not primary precepts.  Nevertheless, while Hoose is right that proportional reasoning in the writing of Aquinas and later scholars suggests that secondary precepts are less important than primary precepts, proportionalism has been condemned by the Roman Catholic Church, the main adopter of Natural Law.  The Church sees proportionalism as a slippery slope towards situation ethics, utilitarianism and antinomianism in ethics. Instead, the Church has chosen to adopt a Heteronomous Ethic, with the Magisterium using Natural Law alongside Scripture and Tradition to develop Church Teachings which are Secondary Precepts.  These are then used as the basis for encyclicals, Catholic instruction and advice as well as for formation. It follows that for ordinary Roman Catholics secondary precepts are more important than Primary Precepts, because they are encouraged to follow Church Teaching rather than to try to develop it!  While the Church accepts Aquinas’ teaching about conscience, it emphasises the importance of formation so that the Synderesis and Conscientia guide Catholics to follow Church teaching in all matters, rather than really to think for themselves.  This suggests that in practice secondary precepts are in fact more important than primary principles, even though this might not be true to Aquinas’ intention.

    In conclusion, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law. As has been established, the list of five primary precepts might be incomplete and is certainly disputed, while also depending on the key precept “good is to be done and evil avoided”.  Further, secondary precepts make more difference in peoples’ lives today than primary precepts.

    To what extent is the cosmological argument a sufficient explanation for the existence of God? [40]

    / vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

    The cosmological argument has its roots in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, but is most associated with Aquinas’ first, second and third ways to demonstrate God’s existence and today with William Lane Craig’s Kalam argument.  While cosmological arguments see God as the “sufficient reason” for the universe, overall, they do not provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of God.

    Firstly, Leibniz’ version of the cosmological argument saw God as the “sufficient reason” for the universe. God is needed, he reasoned, to explain why there is anything at all. In “The Existence of God” Richard Swinburne writes how this is the most basic and persuasive argument for God’s existence.  Leibniz’ reasoning built on Aquinas’ third way, which started with the premises that everything in the universe is contingent and that something cannot come from nothing, concluding that there must be a necessary being – a being which exists because of itself and cannot not exist – to explain the existence of everything else. Yet Kant rejected this line of argument in the introduction to his “Critique of Pure Reason”, pointing out that as everything that we experience exists contingently, necessary existence is not something we can posit or discuss.  For Kant, to exist is to exist contingently and to be capable of non-existence… the idea of necessary existence is contradictory and impossible. While there are those who reject Kant’s argument and indeed his whole worldview, such as Willard Quine and Charles Hartshorne, it remains the dominant position in philosophy. While Kant may not have shown that necessary existence is impossible, his observation that it falls outside the scope of our experience strongly supports that conclusion.  This shows that God is not needed to be the necessary explanation for the universe we experience.

    Secondly, as David Hume observed through his character Philo in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, despite being presented as deductive proofs for God’s existence cosmological arguments fail because there is no way to show that their premises are true. For example, Aquinas starts his first way with the premises that everything in the universe is moved and that things can’t move themselves, concluding that there must therefore be a Prime Mover and that this is what everybody calls God. As Hume pointed out, there is no way to know if everything in the universe is moved or that no thing can move itself because our experience of the universe is too limited to support such sweeping claims.  It is possible that while things in the universe are moved and must be moved by other things, the universe itself could be unmoving and/or self-moving.  As Bertrand Russell later asked, why should not the universe itself be considered a “brute fact”?  Although Big Bang theory seems to have falsified the idea that the Universe could be considered a “brute fact,” in other ways science supports Hume’s scepticism, finding that sub-atomic particles like Quarks do not follow standard laws of causation and logic and forcing William Lane Craig to use more limited premises in his Kalam argument than Aquinas did in his Cosmological Argument.  Craig reasons that since “everything that begins to exist must have a cause” and “the universe began to exist” it follows that “the universe must have a cause”.  Although it strategically stops short of concluding that the cause of the universe is “what everybody calls God” – leaving this for people to infer – Craig’s argument seems persuasive in the context of a layman’s understanding of the standard model of Physics. Yet, Stephen Hawking criticised his argument for assuming that causation must or even could apply where there is no time or space at and before the Big Bang. This shows that the cosmological argument fails to demonstrate God’s existence

    On the other hand, other versions of the cosmological argument have been presented as inductive or even abductive arguments, suggesting that God is the most probable explanation for many observations of movement, causation, contingency and other forms of order in the universe.  This approach acknowledges that science could provide natural explanations for these phenomena, but dismisses these as less probable than the simple, elegant explanation provided in God. Yet, while the prime mover, uncaused cause or necessary being supported by Aquinas’ ways seems   to be a simpler explanation than the complex natural accounts presented by science, as Hume pointed out, the prime mover, if such there is, would be very far from being “what everybody calls God.”  In terms of prime movers, uncaused causes or necessary beings, there could be several for all we know and it/they would hardly need to be personal, immanent or good.  Also, the God of the Bible is nothing if not a complex character, being possessed of many characteristics outside the scope of those possessed by the prime mover, so that Richard Dawkins was right to reject the claim that “God” could ever be a simpler explanation in “The God Delusion”.  While Aquinas did attempt to show how the prime mover, uncaused cause and necessary being demonstrated by the cosmological argument was really the God of Christianity, these explanations were outside the scope of the cosmological arguments and unconvincing.  For example, Aquinas claimed that because God is the prime mover, uncaused cause and necessary being He must be timeless-eternal and outside the universe.  It follows that divine attributes like power, knowledge or goodness must be understood as analogies when describing God. Yet Aquinas’ classical theism is unconvincing because although it attempts to provide a philosophical justification for believing that “God” exists – not least through the cosmological argument – this justification is flawed and comes at the price of undermining both the Bible and Christian Doctrine as sources of knowledge about God.  This shows that inductive or abductive versions of the cosmological argument are no more useful as explanations for God’s existence than deductive versions.

    Further, all versions of the cosmological argument are part of Natural Theology, the attempt to explain that and how God exists using reason. Natural Theology has long been controversial within Christianity, because it assumes that human beings can discover God and potentially salvation for themselves without God’s grace, which idea was dismissed by St Paul (e.g. Ephesians 2:8) and later made a heresy because of St Augustine’s theological arguments.  It follows that for most Christians Natural Theology cannot provide sufficient knowledge of God’s existence or concerning God’s nature for human beings to attain salvation apart from God’s grace.  Instead, Christians must rely on Revealed Theology, such as through Scripture, Jesus and/or personal religious experience, to demonstrate God’s existence, nature and will.  In one way, this makes sense of the cosmological arguments’ failure to show that God is the necessary or even the most probable explanation of the universe and of the disjunct between the attributes of the prime mover and the God of the Bible.  It could be that the cosmological argument, and wider Natural Theology, provides only an indication that God exists, showing that faith is rational and that atheists are as St Paul put it “without excuse”, while maintaining the necessity of revelation and grace for salvation. Yet it seems terribly convenient that Christian doctrine should so cover for the failure of Natural Theology and the cosmological argument. St Paul and St Augustine would both have been aware of versions of the cosmological argument in the work of Plato and Aristotle and that these arguments are not sufficient explanations for the God of Christianity.  Could their theological arguments have been pragmatic rather than principled in their attempt to sideline reason in favour of revelation?

    In conclusion, the cosmological argument does not provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of God. None of the versions of the argument succeed in demonstrating God’s existence. Deductive versions rely on uncertain premises and don’t contain the full conclusion of the Christian God’s existence. Inductive and abductive versions fail to establish that “God” is a simpler explanation of the universe than natural explanations provided by science.  Also, theological attempts to explain why Natural Theology should fail are unconvincing.

    Critically assess Plato’s analogy of the cave as an explanation of reality. [40]

    / vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

    Plato developed his allegory of the cave in Book VII of “The Republic”.  The dialogue here is between Socrates, who seems to give voice to Plato’s own thoughts, and Glaucon, Plato’s older brother. Socrates sets the scene, describing a group of prisoners who have been held underground seeing only shadows for many years, before asking what would happen if one escaped and made his way outside.  The allegory represents Plato’s view of reality, whereby the world we experience through the senses is only one of appearances, whereas ultimate reality is metaphysical and beyond ordinary experience. Despite being influential for many centuries and still capturing creative imaginations today, the explanation of reality it conveys is antiquated, unduly complicated and communicated unclearly so overall, Plato’s allegory is a poor explanation of reality.

    Firstly, through the allegory of the cave Plato suggests that ultimate reality is metaphysical.  The world outside the cave represents Plato’s “world of the forms” in which a hierarchy of universals exist eternally.  The escaped prisoner represents the philosopher, who escapes from the world of appearances through reason, gradually and painfully realising that things are not the way they first seem as they come to terms with the forms through the light of the sun, which represents reason.  While Plato’s explanation of reality is immediately attractive – Iris Murdoch rightly praised Plato’s “blazing imagery” – in practice his suggestion that universal forms have a separate existence in a higher world goes well beyond the evidence. Aristotle, Plato’s pupil, agreed that universal forms were needed to explain our experience of particulars in the world, but he stopped short of suggesting that “formal causes” could be separated from the “material causes” which instantiate them and make them real. This explanation of reality is more persuasive than that communicated by Plato’s allegory of the cave. Further, even Aristotle’s explanation of reality through the four causes has been improved upon through modern philosophy, which casts doubt on the existence of universal forms altogether.  Is there really a separate form of the chair, whether it is separable as Plato suggested or not separable as Aristotle suggested, or is the “form” only an idea or concept in somebody’s mind, subjectively rather than objectively real?  This shows that the explanation of reality communicated by Plato’s allegory of the cave is antiquated.

    Secondly, Plato is vague and inconsistent in his explanation of the world of the forms.  as Julia Annas observes, Plato sees no need to argue for the existence of the forms, so that there is no properly worked out “theory of forms”.  He just alludes the forms in his dialogues as if their existence was beyond dispute, while giving contradictory accounts of what they are.  For example, in the Republic through the allegory of the cave and later in Book X Plato suggests that multiple forms exist with the form of the good (the sun in the allegory of the cave) as the top of a hierarchy of forms, but elsewhere he suggests that there might be only forms of ideals such as beauty and truth or even only one form, the form of the good. Even Plato was aware that the forms did not provide a clear solution to the problem of universals.  He failed to explain what exactly forms are made of and, as he admitted in the Parmenides, to limit the number of forms that would be needed to explain any particular thing.  As Aristotle later explained through his famous “third man” argument, to explain a great man a form of greatness and a form of man would be needed, but also a form of the form of greatness, a form of the form of the form of greatness and so on into infinity.  By Ockham’s Razor we can conclude that any explanation of reality makes reality infinitely more complicated than it appears is far from being useful.

    On the other hand, Plato’s allegory of the cave gestures towards an explanation of reality that dominated European Philosophy through to the Early Modern Period. Descartes Meditations provides a persuasive argument for the rationalism and substance dualism that Plato’s allegories and analogies evoke, and scholarly support for these positions has persisted.  For example, GE Moore and Iris Murdoch advanced “Platonist” positions in the first half of the 20th Century and David Chalmers identifies as a substance dualist today. Nevertheless, while Plato’s basic ideas influenced these later philosophers, none has accepted the explanation of reality communicated by the allegory of the cave uncritically and all have had to do a great deal of work in arguing for their positions.  In addition, Plato’s allegory of the cave has been associated with a new theory that our “reality” is in fact an AR projection or hologram.  Cosmology has undermined the “standard model” of physics just as it did the Newtonian steady-state universe; the absence of a clear and appealing model to replace it has made it fashionable to speculate about the nature of ultimate reality again, casting doubt on the view that the universe really is what it appears to be through the empirical senses.  Nevertheless, this doesn’t make Plato’s allegory of the cave or the explanation of reality that it conveys more credible, it only demonstrates that the human inclination to speculate as Plato did persists despite scientific and technological advances. Further, Plato’s use of allegories like the cave, as well as analogies like the sun and the divided line to communicate his ideas shows how his approach was more literary and creative than a serious attempt to explain reality. The fact that the allegory of the cave with its theme of voyage and return has become one of the seven basic plots, influencing religion as well as books and films from Narnia to the Matrix, only supports this. Plato’s allegory grips the imagination and changes our perception of reality rather than describing it.  So therefore, Plato’s allegory of the cave is a poor explanation of reality. 

    In conclusion, despite being influential for many centuries and still capturing creative imaginations today, the explanation of reality conveyed by Plato’s allegory of the cave is antiquated, unduly complicated and communicated unclearly.

    Aquinas successfully demonstrates that religious language should be understood in terms of analogy. Discuss. [40]

    / vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

    As the Summa Theologica makes clear, St Thomas Aquinas’ approach to religious language emerged from his concept of God.  As a Classical Theist, Aquinas saw God as timeless eternal, meaning that words applied to God cannot be understood univocally, to mean the same as they would when applied to created things. While the Bible, the Creeds and Christian doctrines use language univocally in ways that make God seem like a person, subject to limitation and change, for Aquinas God is timelessly other and should not be so anthropomorphised and limited by language.  He saw some merits in the apophatic approach to language, which speaks of God by negation if at all seeing direct religious language as equivocal, but wanted to preserve the possibility of affirming some things about God in a meaningful way, recognising that an equivocal approach to language undermines philosophy and doctrine in a way that must eventually be fatal to organised religion.  The result was Aquinas’ argument that words applied to God should be understood as analogies which is successful in avoiding both the pitfalls of univocalism and giving in to equivocalism, although it depends heavily on his concept of God and so may not be useful to all Christians.

    Firstly, Aquinas claimed that claims such as “God is good” should not be taken to imply that God is morally good, such as would imply choice and the existence of independent values but should instead be understood as analogies of proportion. When we say that something is good, we mean that it largely fulfils its nature.  Human nature is to be free and moral, but if God is the origin of our freedom and of moral values it makes little sense to anthropomorphise him by assuming his nature is like ours.  Nothing in this world is perfect; because of time and space nothing can fulfil 100% of its nature.  For example, a person has the potential to be a baby and an adult.  However good they are, they can only fulfil part of their potential at one time, such as by being a good adult.  Nevertheless, God is outside the time and space that holds us back from actualising our full potential and being perfect. When we say that God is good, we mean that God fulfils 100% of his timeless divine nature, being changelessly perfect; what it is for God to fulfil God’s nature is not what it means for us to fulfil our more limited nature.  John Hick used the example of a man and his dog, both of which might be said to be faithful. What it is for a man to be faithful and for a dog to be faithful are not quite the same, but by saying they are faithful we mean that both do a large proportion of what we expect of a faithful member of their species. It follows that our goodness is not the same as God’s goodness… the word good is not used univocally when applied to God… but there is a connection between our goodness and God’s goodness which means that words applied to God are not equivocal either.   In this way, Aquinas’ analogy of proportion is successful in avoiding both the pitfalls of univocalism and giving into equivocalism.

    Secondly, Aquinas claimed that attributes like goodness exist primarily in God as the creator and only secondarily in created things, so that what we say about God and created things is connected while still having different meanings and preserving the otherness of God. To explain his analogy of attribution, Aquinas used the example of a bull and its urine… the health of the bull is primary and the health of the urine it produces is secondary… the health of the bull and its urine consist in different things, but the health of the one is the source of the health of the other, so there is a connection.  Simon Oliver uses the example of me and my breakfast yoghurt… both might be said to be healthy, but the healthiness of the yoghurt is secondary and depends on my healthiness, which is primary.  My health might consist in having clear skin, energy and a habit of going jogging… but the health of the yoghurt does not consist in any of these things.  In the same way, the goodness, power or wisdom of God is primary, and the goodness, power or wisdom of created things is secondary.  What it is for God to be good, powerful or wise might be radically different from what it means for a person to be these things, and not only by degree, avoiding limiting God through a univocal use of language.  Yet, there is a clear connection between the goodness, power and wisdom of God and of created creatures, which avoids an equivocal approach to religious language also. 

    On the other hand, as Anthony Kenny pointed out the analogical meaning of God’s attributes preserved by Aquinas is extremely limited, making this approach to religious language unsuccessful when it comes to sustaining religion in a practical way.  Kenny suggested that the idea of timeless attributes such as goodness, power or wisdom seems “radically incoherent”, which is a fair criticism, as is the related point that many believers do not understand language analogically, even those who lead or have led the Church.  While Ian Ramsey was right to point out how people often use “qualifiers” like “timelessly” to signify that their use of words to describe God should not be taken as “ordinary language” but as religious language which is “logically odd”, in practice many people do not use such qualifiers or seem to understand that there should be any difficulty in using language univocally at all. Further, as Nelson Pike observed, the God of the Bible is “unavoidably tensed”.  It makes little sense to see God as timeless when that would make the creation, the fall and the resurrection simultaneous in God’s timeless vision. This is why Protestant philosophers look for other ways of understanding religious language, seeing Aquinas analogical approach as bound up in a concept of God which is fundamentally unchristian. John MacQuarrie lamented the adoption of the Greek concept of God into the Christian tradition, seeing this as the cause of multiple avoidable philosophical problems that have beset the faith through the best part of two millennia.  In this context, Richard Swinburne and Nicholas Wolterstorff approach religious language in a more straightforward univocal way.  Further, some Classical Theists support a more univocal approach to religious language than Aquinas.  For examples, St Anselm and John Duns Scotus reasoned that God as creator must have created the concepts through which we understand and speak of Him, meaning that we can speak confidently about God using a far wider range of words and meanings than Aquinas would allow.  All of this suggests that the success of Aquinas’ analogical approach to religious language is limited to those who share his concept of God and does not extend even to all of those.

    In conclusion, Aquinas’ analogical approach to understanding religious language is coherent and persuasive if one shares his concept of God, although it is possibly too limited to support religious practice.  Nevertheless, many Christians do not accept either Aquinas’ concept of God or his analogical approach to understanding religious language because they choose to focus on revealed rather than on natural theology as the primary source of their knowledge of God.

    Examples of mystical experiences should be considered valid religious experiences. Discuss [40]

    / vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

    In his “Varieties of Religious Experience” William James argued that examples of mystical experiences which have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic justify their recipient’s belief in God and deserve to be taken seriously by others, as potentially valid religious experiences. Yet, atheists like Richard Dawkins remain unconvinced, arguing that “exceptional claims demand exceptional evidence” and dismissing all “mystical experiences” as fakes or mistakes. Overall, Dawkins’ argument arises from prejudice and an unscientifically closed mind, so James’ argument is more persuasive.

    Firstly, Dawkins rejects the claim of any “mystical experience” to be considered a valid religious experience.  Like David Hume in his analysis “Of Miracles”, Dawkins reasons that it is always more probable that the experience was the result of psychological and/or physiological processes than that the experience was of God.  Dawkins’ argument has intuitive appeal and has been supported by other atheists, including Susan Blackmore, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, yet it does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Yes, scientists can “explain away” individual experiences… saying that St Augustine undergoing a moral crisis and St Bernadette an attention-seeker… but each explanation is different, while what the mystics claim to have experienced is one and the same. Is it more likely that so many different people in different circumstances are all deluded from multiple different improbable causes, or that what so many people have reported to have experienced in diverse ways is real?  As James concluded, “higher” mystical experiences “offer us HYPOTHESES, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset.[1]” It is fair to say that Dawkins chooses to ignore examples of mystical experiences which, if taken seriously and properly investigated, might yield a better insight into reality than the narrow scientific materialism that Dawkins seems wedded to.  In “The Existence of God” Richard Swinburne has shown how it is slightly more probable that God exists than not and that – given that prior probability and the principles of credulity and testimony – the existence of so many religious experiences (though defined more broadly than according to James’ four marks) tips the balance decisively in favour of God’s existence. Dawkins’ argument that mystical experiences are always more probably fakes or mistakes than valid has thus been falsified.

    Secondly, scientists like Dawkins have sought to provide alternative explanations for mystical experiences to show that they are not valid religious experiences.  Yet, as James pointed out, such explanations cannot account for the positive and lasting change that such experiences bring about in their recipients’ lives. For example, it may be that St Paul’s experiences were the result of epileptic seizures, but this medical explanation can’t account for the spiritual effect of the experiences on Paul and through him, on the world. Many people have had epileptic seizures, but only one wrote most of the New Testament. Further, despite his scepticism about their causes, Dawkins is fascinated by spiritual experiences and volunteered to be a research subject, wearing Michael Persinger’s “God helmet” to discover what so many religious people have felt.  Afterwards, he said that he was “very disappointed” by the experience, finding that the brain stimulation did not in fact create the sensation that mystics report.  This suggests that one of the most common scientific means of “explaining away” mystical experiences is not credible. In addition, assuming that some experiences are valid, God must appear to people in some way; if not through visions or voices, then through some ineffable, transient sensation as reported by mystics.  Yet, whatever sensation God chooses is bound to be affected by disorders, so that if a person has an ineffable sensation, it is likely to be diagnosed in terms of an associated disorder.  Also, even if scientists can identify how somebody might have an unusual sensation, this does not account for why they had the sensation… God could be working through physiological processes.  All of this shows that Dawkins is wrong and that examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.

    On the other hand, claimed “mystical experiences” are very diverse and vary in credibility. It is difficult to define mystical experiences so that only those that are credible are included when claiming that they should be considered valid religious experiences. For example, James argued that “higher” mystical experiences, such as should be considered as valid religious experiences, have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic. Yet, it is not clear that even the examples James appeals to have all four marks.  James uses St Teresa of Avila’s descriptions of mystical experiences to develop his argument, yet were these experiences really either passive or transient… and given the number of words she used to describe them, were they ineffable either?  Further, other scholars have defined mystical experiences differently, either more narrowly as in the definitions of Otto and Stace, or more broadly, as in the definitions of Swinburne and the Alister Hardy Centre.  The lack of a single, clear definition for mystical experiences and the inclusion of less credible experiences within some of these definitions surely undermines the case for considering them valid religious experiences.  Nevertheless, perhaps the lack of a clear definition is to be expected if mystical experiences are valid religious experiences. As James points out, language is inadequate when it comes to describing God so that scholars have sometimes resorted to the apophatic way or analogy and the use of qualifiers. Why would we expect people to be able to describe mystical experiences of God any more clearly? 

    In conclusion, examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.  While some claimed mystical experiences lack credibility and are probably not valid religious experiences, others deserve serious consideration and scientific investigation that does not begin from a fixed starting point of naïve materialism.

    [1] https://csrs.nd.edu/assets/59930/williams_1902.pdf page 325

    Marx does not offer a satisfactory solution to the problem of the exploitation of the poor. Discuss. [40]

    / vardycharlotte / Leave a comment

    Karl Marx’ proposed solution to the problem of the poor proletariat being exploited by the bourgeoisie within a Capitalist economic system is to abolish that system – as well as the superstructure that perpetuates it including religion – through a violent revolution.  By contrast, Liberation Theology has proposed that the first and second act of praxis offer a better solution, which obvious avoids the pitfalls of violent revolution while still achieving change, and mainstream Christian teaching has proposed that charitable work, combined with spiritual formation and prayer, is the best solution because it combines efforts to improve conditions for the poor with spiritual preparation for the afterlife, in which the only lasting equality can be attained. In theory, Marx offers a satisfactory solution, however in practice and largely because of political opposition to Marxism from the entrenched vested interests of the bourgeoisie, mainstream Christian teaching provides the most satisfactory solution.

    Marx’s solution of revolution is theoretically at least the most satisfactory solution to the problem of the exploitation of the poor.  Only by dispelling the false class consciousness that capitalism depends on, through education and the weakening of religious influence, will the proletariat recognise their own exploitation and become resolved to stop it.  As Marx observed, capitalism is inherently unstable because it consists of a vast and growing majority of people being oppressed and cheated by a small and shrinking minority.  Capitalism cannot continue without the acquiescence of the poor, which the bourgeoisie achieve by keeping the poor divided and in ignorance.  Marx was right that religious teaching serves to keep the poor acquiescent, encouraging them to believe that those in power rule with God’s authority, that resistance is sinful and will be punished eternally after death and that they should focus on being peaceful and compliant.  As such religion forms part of the superstructure or what Althusser later called the “Ideological State Apparatus”, which creates and perpetuates the false class consciousness that capitalism needs the poor to believe in order to permit their own exploitation.  Abolishing the superstructure, including religion, is both the precondition for and aim of the revolution, which will liberate the poor from oppression.  Examples of countries which have gone through a Marxist revolution include Russia and more recently Cuba… in both cases capitalism and religion were overthrown and inequality between rich and poor was reduced.  Of course, neither example is wholly positive.  The Russian revolution quickly descended into Stalinism and the Cuban revolution led to decades of poverty for all Cubans, but arguably this was due to political opposition from entrenched capitalist interests overseas.  For example, the Cuban revolution struggled with poverty because the USA enforced trade embargoes in order to destabilise the Marxist government.  This shows that while in theory Marxism offers the most satisfactory solution to the problem of the exploitation of the poor, in practice Marxist revolutions struggle because they encounter powerful opposition which increases and prolongs bloodshed and creates greater poverty across society. 

    It follows that mainstream Christian teaching offers a more satisfactory solution to the problem of the exploitation of the poor in practice.  The Church has been committed to giving the poor a “preferential option” since the late 1960s, recognising the need to address the growing inequality and exploitation caused by free market capitalism in practical as well as spiritual ways.  Gaudiem et Spes (1965), the last document emerging from the Second Vatican Council, clearly identifies the exploitation of the poor as a major problem inherent in capitalist societies and recognises the impatience of Christians to change this.  Pope Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio (1967) cries out against the “less than human conditions” endured by the poor, recognising that efficiency should not come at the expense of workers’ humanity and reminding Christians that “the earth belongs to everyone, not just the rich.”  Following on from these teachings, through the Puebla Document (1979) CELAM called for every Catholic to give the poor a “preferential option,” using a phrase coined by Fr Pedro Arrupe in 1968.   Nevertheless, by a “preferential option” the Vatican and CELAM meant that Christians should “be the evangeliser of the poor and one with them, a witness to the value of the riches of the Kingdom and the humble servant of all our people. [Puebla Document]” This suggests that while Christians should stand in solidarity with the poor and serve the poor, as Jesus did, their focus should be spiritual in spreading the Gospel and helping those who are exploited to recognise that there is hope in God’s Kingdom.  In practice, in the absence of a practical prospect of achieving liberation for the poor through a Marxist revolution, focusing on improving their immediate conditions through sustainable development projects and helping them retain hope and avoid alienation must be the most satisfactory solution. 

    On the other hand, Marx and many other secularists have argued that Christianity’s focus on the Kingdom of God and on heavenly justice encourages the poor to put up with the status quo, however unjust it might be, and so serves the interests of capitalism.  Inspired by Gaudiem et Spes, Populorum Progressio and the Medillin Document of CELAM, Liberation Theologians went further than the mainstream Church, interpreting the “preferential option for the poor” in more political terms and advocating structural change.  In his “A Theology of Liberation” (1971) Gustavo Gutierrez prioritised orthopraxy over orthodoxy and described how Christians should live with the poor, not only stand in solidarity with them (first act praxis), and from that perspective re-read scripture with a “hermeneutic of suspicion”, being awake to the possibility that traditional interpretations of it have encouraged the poor to acquiesce in their exploitation (second act praxis).  From the perspective of the poor, Jesus seems like a political liberator, determined to establish the Kingdom of God on Earth through a revolution of some sort.  While Gutierrez focused on a social revolution, Leonardo Boff recognised the need for more decisive action to overthrow unjust regimes.  He recognised the good achieved by socialist revolutions and that this had been achieved without help from religion, noting that Jesus recognised and promised reward to those who had served God by showing love to their neighbours without realising it.  Of course, this led to Liberation Theology being condemned by the Vatican in 1984 and 1986. In the context of priests being targeted by both right wing and left wing military factions across South America because the line between religion and politics had been blurred, the Papacy criticised those, like Boff, who engaged with Marxism too much and too uncritically.  This is why it is mainstream Christianity and not Liberation Theology which offers the more satisfactory solution to the problem of the exploitation of the poor.  While Liberation Theology tries to combine Marxism and Christian Teaching, this only serves to undermine the ability of Christianity to address the effects of exploitation while doing nothing to make a lasting Marxist revolution more realistic and failing to recognise the threat that Marxism itself presents to religion in all forms.  While Liberation Theology might seem to offer a more holistic solution to the problems of the poor than Marxism does, recognising the need to address the spiritual poverty caused by exploitation and alienation in a way that classical Marxism does not, in practice it struggles to deliver any solution because it attracts hostility from secular and religious authorities alike in short order, compounding the problems of the poor rather than solving them.

    In conclusion, mainstream Christian teaching offers the most practical solution to the problem of the exploitation of the poor.  It encourages all Christians to advocate for reforms to the Capitalist system and to give time and money towards sustainable development projects, while also giving hope to the oppressed poor, albeit hope mainly focused on the next world rather than this one.   Mainstream Christian teaching recognises the wisdom of Jesus’ words “those who live by the sword will die by the sword.” The fate of so many Marxists and Marxist sympathising Liberation Theologians only serves to demonstrate this, along with the deaths of mainstream Christians such as Oscar Romero who died because Liberation Theology had blurred the line between religion and politics. In focusing on peaceful solutions, mainly in an afterlife, and by disavowing Liberation Theology and other political allegiances, Christianity is able to offer a more satisfactory solution to the poor in practice than more ambitious but unrealistic alternatives.