religion

In meta-ethics, the term “good” has an objective factual basis. Discuss [40]

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In meta-ethics, in the past most scholars have held that the term “good” has an objective factual basis. Moral realists include ethical monotheists, who see the term good referring to God and God’s commands, as well as ethical naturalists, who see the term good referring to some quality that can be observed, and ethical non-naturalists, who see the term good referring to a rational intuition. On the other hand, since the early part of the 20th Century moral non-realism has come to dominate.  For example, non-realists like AJ Ayer and JL Mackie argue that the term “good” has no objective factual basis because it does not refer to a verifiable point of reference but rather expresses subjective feelings and emotions.  Overall, today the claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis is not persuasive.

Firstly, ethical monotheists claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis in God and God’s commands.  The Bible claims that “only God is truly good” Mark 10:18 and this is supported by both Classical Theism and Theistic Personalism, which have in different ways established that God is the omnibenevolent creator and the source of goodness in human actions. Further, at least for Protestant Christians, faith is Sola Scriptura and the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide, which suggests that what is good depends on God’s commands, which can be checked against the Bible, objectively.  Nevertheless, ethical monotheism is not credible.  Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma shows that if God is the source of moral standards, as ethical monotheism suggests, then God cannot be good but is an arbitrary tyrant.  On the other hand, if in fact there are objective moral standards that God follows, he can be good but is not the origin of goodness as ethical monotheists suggest, and neither is He all-powerful.  Bertrand Russell found the Euthyphro Dilemma so persuasive that he used it as the basis for a disproof of God. Further, centuries of Church history demonstrate the problems with the ethical monotheist claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis, when Christians so rarely agree on what it is or involves. Biblical Criticism shows that God’s commandments are not clear from the Bible, existing in different sometimes contradictory lists, being obviously influenced by the contexts of the biblical authors and being wide open to interpretation.  For example, the ten commandments are detailed in Exodus 20 and Exodus 34 and again in Deuteronomy 5.  The versions are phrased and organized differently, and the order of the coveting commandments is different between Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5.  Further, Jesus said that the two greatest commandments were love God and love of neighbour in Mark 12 and also that love was the only commandment in John 13.  Which commandments should a Christian follow and with what priority?  Further, the Commandments have always been interpreted differently by different Christians.  For example, Catholics and Lutherans combine the first two commandments, “no other gods” and “no graven images” while other Protestant Christians separate the first two commandments, making “no graven images” a separate commandment and leading to radically different attitudes to art and architecture even within Protestantism.  These examples show how ethical monotheism and its claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis is not credible.

Secondly, ethical naturalists claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis which can be observed.  For example, the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham argued that “nature has placed mankind under two sovereign masters; the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain”, reasoning that “good” refers to actions which produce the maximum amount of pleasure, which can be observed and measured using the seven criteria of extent, duration, intensity, certainty, propinquity, purity and fecundity, as well as the minimum amount of pain.  However, ethical naturalism is undermined by the is-ought gap, which Hume explained thus “in every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it’s necessary that it should be observed and explained; and while a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”  Hume’s point was that we can observe nature and what is, but we can’t observe any basis for ought claims at all.  Ethical naturalism is based on assertion and not argument and has no observable factual basis for what it claims to be good. Further and despite being a moral realist and thinking that the term “good” has an objective factual basis, G.E Moore claimed that ethical naturalism relies on the “naturalistic fallacy”, the incorrect assumption that something is good because it occurs in nature or is considered normal in society.  For Moore, just because something is natural or normal does not make it good.  For example, misogyny and sexual violence have been endemic through history and still are across the world today… this does not make these good or right.  This shows that the claim that the term good has an objective factual basis cannot b supported through ethical naturalism either.

On the other hand, G.E Moore and other ethical non-naturalists have conceded that what is good depends neither on the commands of God nor on anything that can be observed in nature.  Instead, drawing on Plato, they have argued that we know what is good as a rational intuition.  This explains why people find some actions which go against laws and don’t maximise happiness are good… such as a soldier disobeying orders and getting himself killed while trying to save a comrade.  Nevertheless, ethical non-naturalism is no more persuasive a basis for the claim that the term “good” has an objective factual basis than ethical monotheism or ethical naturalism.  The claim that we all know what goodness is as a rational intuition ignores the fact that people have widely different concepts of what is good.  Actions like that of the soldier are controversial… yes, some people would see him as a hero and say that his actions were “good” despite breaking the rules and compounding suffering… but many would reject this and argue that he should have obeyed orders and lived. Further, AJ Ayer was right to point out that claims about good, bad, right and wrong are better seen as expressions of subjective feelings and emotions, having no objective factual basis, than as having an objective basis in a rational intuition that we can’t observe or prove. Ayer’s argument develops that of Hume, that while we can observe what is, claims about what we ought to do are pure assertion and not verifiable.  Further, JL Mackie later agreed with Ayer, pointing out that ethical claims are based on an error and that moral judgments in fact “reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of life.”  Here Mackie was influenced by Wittgenstein, who had cast doubt on the ability of any term to have an “objective factual basis” arguing that meaning in language comes from usage and not reference so that it is not objective or factual. All these points suggest that ethical non-naturalism fails to provide any better defence of the claim that terms like “good” have an objective factual basis than ethical monotheism and ethical naturalism and that in fact ethical non-realism is more persuasive in its suggestion that terms like “good” have only a subjective basis.

In conclusion, the term “good” has no objective factual basis but is rather subjective and best understood as an expression of personal or communal feelings and emotions.  Today, ethical realism lacks credibility, so attention should be focused on refining ethical non-realism to provide the best possible explanation for how and why people use ethical language.

The five primary precepts are the most important part of natural law. Discuss [40]

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St Thomas Aquinas explained his theory of natural law, which shares many characteristics with other versions of natural law, in Summa 2i. 94.2.  He explained how natural laws are discoverable through RATIO, the human intellect, which is made up of SPECULATIVE REASON and PRACTICAL REASON.  Speculative reason reveals abstract notions and principles, such as “good is that which all things seek after,” then practical reason applies these to real life, developing moral precepts for us to follow.  For example, “this is the first precept of [natural] law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” Aquinas goes on to explain how “all other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.” He elaborated on the precepts of natural law, listing and explaining primary and secondary precepts, explaining how “Since… good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.” Primary precepts are thus established as “objects of pursuit” or prescriptions and secondary precepts as “objects of avoidance” or prohibitions.  For examples, “whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law…” meaning that the preservation of human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept. Aquinas also lists as primary precepts sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God and shunning ignorance as well as living in society, avoiding offending those amongst whom one must live.  Overall, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law.

    Firstly, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law because they are derived from the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided”, and different scholars have derived different lists of primary precepts, which have gone on to produce different lists of secondary precepts and disagreements in how natural law guides people in practical situations. Aquinas discussed whether or not his list of primary precepts was infallible in Summa 2i. 94. 2 and concluded that the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided” is infallible, because it is so closely related to the Primary Principle of speculative reason “good is that which all things seek after” and because speculative reason cannot be wrong, its objects being necessary truths.  Nevertheless, the primary precepts of the preservation of human life, sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God, shunning ignorance and living in society are known through synderesis, which must develop its understanding of these precepts as it is formed.  While nothing the synderesis suggests can be wrong, the list of primary precepts it provides might be incomplete, which explains why some societies seem unaware of some basic human goods.  Aquinas explains how it is possible to be unaware that living in society and avoiding offending neighbours is a primary precept, “thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).”  This would explain why later versions of natural law have listed the primary precepts differently, and particularly why some have added to Aquinas’ five.  For example, John Finnis lists seven basic human goods, including play and aesthetic experience.  This could be because Finnis’ synderesis has developed further than Aquinas’ did, coming to recognise the essential importance of fun and beauty to human flourishing in a way that Aquinas never did.  It follows that the fact that the list of five primary precepts provided by Aquinas, and indeed other lists in other versions of Natural Law, differ and might be incomplete suggests that they cannot be the most important part of natural law.

    Secondly, the primary precepts are general injunctions and need to be translated into secondary precepts in order to provide useful moral guidance. Whereas the primary precepts are positive, secondary precepts are negative and tell people what they must not do.  For example, preserve human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept.  Yet there are often multiple secondary precepts derived from each primary precept.  For example, the primary precept of living in society would lead to a huge number of secondary prohibitions, ranging from do not steal to do not lie to do not be jealous or aggressive… It follows that the majority of moral rules that people live by in practice are secondary and not primary precepts, suggesting that the secondary precepts are more important than the primary precepts.  Of course, secondary precepts are all derived from the primary precepts, so could not exist without the primary precepts and would differ if the primary precepts differed.  This might suggest that the primary precepts are more important than the secondary precepts, and yet for most people their moral awareness begins with the conscientia speaking against certain actions in a negative way, such as by warning people not to cheat or deceive.  Although it is true that the conscientia does this because it is seeking to apply the primary precepts to specific situations, in practice people are usually aware of the secondary precepts before or even without being aware of the primary precepts, which suggests that in fact the secondary precepts are more important.

    On the other hand, Proportionalists like Bernard Hoose would argue that the primary precepts of Natural Law are more important than the secondary precepts because there are sometimes proportional justifications for breaking secondary precepts, but never for breaking primary precepts.  For example, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to the secondary precept, don’t run inside… because running causes accidents and people might get hurt… but in the case of an explosion it might be proportionally justified to run, risking accidents, when this is the only way to save lives. Similarly, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to a secondary prohibition against abortion, but in the case of an ectopic pregnancy where inaction would lead to the death of both mother and child, it might be proportionally justified to abort in order to preserve the maximum number of human lives. Hoose points out that even Aquinas uses proportional reasoning to justify war, capital punishment and even the toleration of prostitution… so surely this suggests that primary precepts are more important than secondary precepts, given that secondary precepts can be broken in the pursuit of good, but not primary precepts.  Nevertheless, while Hoose is right that proportional reasoning in the writing of Aquinas and later scholars suggests that secondary precepts are less important than primary precepts, proportionalism has been condemned by the Roman Catholic Church, the main adopter of Natural Law.  The Church sees proportionalism as a slippery slope towards situation ethics, utilitarianism and antinomianism in ethics. Instead, the Church has chosen to adopt a Heteronomous Ethic, with the Magisterium using Natural Law alongside Scripture and Tradition to develop Church Teachings which are Secondary Precepts.  These are then used as the basis for encyclicals, Catholic instruction and advice as well as for formation. It follows that for ordinary Roman Catholics secondary precepts are more important than Primary Precepts, because they are encouraged to follow Church Teaching rather than to try to develop it!  While the Church accepts Aquinas’ teaching about conscience, it emphasises the importance of formation so that the Synderesis and Conscientia guide Catholics to follow Church teaching in all matters, rather than really to think for themselves.  This suggests that in practice secondary precepts are in fact more important than primary principles, even though this might not be true to Aquinas’ intention.

    In conclusion, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law. As has been established, the list of five primary precepts might be incomplete and is certainly disputed, while also depending on the key precept “good is to be done and evil avoided”.  Further, secondary precepts make more difference in peoples’ lives today than primary precepts.

    To what extent is the cosmological argument a sufficient explanation for the existence of God? [40]

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    The cosmological argument has its roots in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, but is most associated with Aquinas’ first, second and third ways to demonstrate God’s existence and today with William Lane Craig’s Kalam argument.  While cosmological arguments see God as the “sufficient reason” for the universe, overall, they do not provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of God.

    Firstly, Leibniz’ version of the cosmological argument saw God as the “sufficient reason” for the universe. God is needed, he reasoned, to explain why there is anything at all. In “The Existence of God” Richard Swinburne writes how this is the most basic and persuasive argument for God’s existence.  Leibniz’ reasoning built on Aquinas’ third way, which started with the premises that everything in the universe is contingent and that something cannot come from nothing, concluding that there must be a necessary being – a being which exists because of itself and cannot not exist – to explain the existence of everything else. Yet Kant rejected this line of argument in the introduction to his “Critique of Pure Reason”, pointing out that as everything that we experience exists contingently, necessary existence is not something we can posit or discuss.  For Kant, to exist is to exist contingently and to be capable of non-existence… the idea of necessary existence is contradictory and impossible. While there are those who reject Kant’s argument and indeed his whole worldview, such as Willard Quine and Charles Hartshorne, it remains the dominant position in philosophy. While Kant may not have shown that necessary existence is impossible, his observation that it falls outside the scope of our experience strongly supports that conclusion.  This shows that God is not needed to be the necessary explanation for the universe we experience.

    Secondly, as David Hume observed through his character Philo in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, despite being presented as deductive proofs for God’s existence cosmological arguments fail because there is no way to show that their premises are true. For example, Aquinas starts his first way with the premises that everything in the universe is moved and that things can’t move themselves, concluding that there must therefore be a Prime Mover and that this is what everybody calls God. As Hume pointed out, there is no way to know if everything in the universe is moved or that no thing can move itself because our experience of the universe is too limited to support such sweeping claims.  It is possible that while things in the universe are moved and must be moved by other things, the universe itself could be unmoving and/or self-moving.  As Bertrand Russell later asked, why should not the universe itself be considered a “brute fact”?  Although Big Bang theory seems to have falsified the idea that the Universe could be considered a “brute fact,” in other ways science supports Hume’s scepticism, finding that sub-atomic particles like Quarks do not follow standard laws of causation and logic and forcing William Lane Craig to use more limited premises in his Kalam argument than Aquinas did in his Cosmological Argument.  Craig reasons that since “everything that begins to exist must have a cause” and “the universe began to exist” it follows that “the universe must have a cause”.  Although it strategically stops short of concluding that the cause of the universe is “what everybody calls God” – leaving this for people to infer – Craig’s argument seems persuasive in the context of a layman’s understanding of the standard model of Physics. Yet, Stephen Hawking criticised his argument for assuming that causation must or even could apply where there is no time or space at and before the Big Bang. This shows that the cosmological argument fails to demonstrate God’s existence

    On the other hand, other versions of the cosmological argument have been presented as inductive or even abductive arguments, suggesting that God is the most probable explanation for many observations of movement, causation, contingency and other forms of order in the universe.  This approach acknowledges that science could provide natural explanations for these phenomena, but dismisses these as less probable than the simple, elegant explanation provided in God. Yet, while the prime mover, uncaused cause or necessary being supported by Aquinas’ ways seems   to be a simpler explanation than the complex natural accounts presented by science, as Hume pointed out, the prime mover, if such there is, would be very far from being “what everybody calls God.”  In terms of prime movers, uncaused causes or necessary beings, there could be several for all we know and it/they would hardly need to be personal, immanent or good.  Also, the God of the Bible is nothing if not a complex character, being possessed of many characteristics outside the scope of those possessed by the prime mover, so that Richard Dawkins was right to reject the claim that “God” could ever be a simpler explanation in “The God Delusion”.  While Aquinas did attempt to show how the prime mover, uncaused cause and necessary being demonstrated by the cosmological argument was really the God of Christianity, these explanations were outside the scope of the cosmological arguments and unconvincing.  For example, Aquinas claimed that because God is the prime mover, uncaused cause and necessary being He must be timeless-eternal and outside the universe.  It follows that divine attributes like power, knowledge or goodness must be understood as analogies when describing God. Yet Aquinas’ classical theism is unconvincing because although it attempts to provide a philosophical justification for believing that “God” exists – not least through the cosmological argument – this justification is flawed and comes at the price of undermining both the Bible and Christian Doctrine as sources of knowledge about God.  This shows that inductive or abductive versions of the cosmological argument are no more useful as explanations for God’s existence than deductive versions.

    Further, all versions of the cosmological argument are part of Natural Theology, the attempt to explain that and how God exists using reason. Natural Theology has long been controversial within Christianity, because it assumes that human beings can discover God and potentially salvation for themselves without God’s grace, which idea was dismissed by St Paul (e.g. Ephesians 2:8) and later made a heresy because of St Augustine’s theological arguments.  It follows that for most Christians Natural Theology cannot provide sufficient knowledge of God’s existence or concerning God’s nature for human beings to attain salvation apart from God’s grace.  Instead, Christians must rely on Revealed Theology, such as through Scripture, Jesus and/or personal religious experience, to demonstrate God’s existence, nature and will.  In one way, this makes sense of the cosmological arguments’ failure to show that God is the necessary or even the most probable explanation of the universe and of the disjunct between the attributes of the prime mover and the God of the Bible.  It could be that the cosmological argument, and wider Natural Theology, provides only an indication that God exists, showing that faith is rational and that atheists are as St Paul put it “without excuse”, while maintaining the necessity of revelation and grace for salvation. Yet it seems terribly convenient that Christian doctrine should so cover for the failure of Natural Theology and the cosmological argument. St Paul and St Augustine would both have been aware of versions of the cosmological argument in the work of Plato and Aristotle and that these arguments are not sufficient explanations for the God of Christianity.  Could their theological arguments have been pragmatic rather than principled in their attempt to sideline reason in favour of revelation?

    In conclusion, the cosmological argument does not provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of God. None of the versions of the argument succeed in demonstrating God’s existence. Deductive versions rely on uncertain premises and don’t contain the full conclusion of the Christian God’s existence. Inductive and abductive versions fail to establish that “God” is a simpler explanation of the universe than natural explanations provided by science.  Also, theological attempts to explain why Natural Theology should fail are unconvincing.

    Examples of mystical experiences should be considered valid religious experiences. Discuss [40]

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    In his “Varieties of Religious Experience” William James argued that examples of mystical experiences which have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic justify their recipient’s belief in God and deserve to be taken seriously by others, as potentially valid religious experiences. Yet, atheists like Richard Dawkins remain unconvinced, arguing that “exceptional claims demand exceptional evidence” and dismissing all “mystical experiences” as fakes or mistakes. Overall, Dawkins’ argument arises from prejudice and an unscientifically closed mind, so James’ argument is more persuasive.

    Firstly, Dawkins rejects the claim of any “mystical experience” to be considered a valid religious experience.  Like David Hume in his analysis “Of Miracles”, Dawkins reasons that it is always more probable that the experience was the result of psychological and/or physiological processes than that the experience was of God.  Dawkins’ argument has intuitive appeal and has been supported by other atheists, including Susan Blackmore, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, yet it does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Yes, scientists can “explain away” individual experiences… saying that St Augustine undergoing a moral crisis and St Bernadette an attention-seeker… but each explanation is different, while what the mystics claim to have experienced is one and the same. Is it more likely that so many different people in different circumstances are all deluded from multiple different improbable causes, or that what so many people have reported to have experienced in diverse ways is real?  As James concluded, “higher” mystical experiences “offer us HYPOTHESES, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset.[1]” It is fair to say that Dawkins chooses to ignore examples of mystical experiences which, if taken seriously and properly investigated, might yield a better insight into reality than the narrow scientific materialism that Dawkins seems wedded to.  In “The Existence of God” Richard Swinburne has shown how it is slightly more probable that God exists than not and that – given that prior probability and the principles of credulity and testimony – the existence of so many religious experiences (though defined more broadly than according to James’ four marks) tips the balance decisively in favour of God’s existence. Dawkins’ argument that mystical experiences are always more probably fakes or mistakes than valid has thus been falsified.

    Secondly, scientists like Dawkins have sought to provide alternative explanations for mystical experiences to show that they are not valid religious experiences.  Yet, as James pointed out, such explanations cannot account for the positive and lasting change that such experiences bring about in their recipients’ lives. For example, it may be that St Paul’s experiences were the result of epileptic seizures, but this medical explanation can’t account for the spiritual effect of the experiences on Paul and through him, on the world. Many people have had epileptic seizures, but only one wrote most of the New Testament. Further, despite his scepticism about their causes, Dawkins is fascinated by spiritual experiences and volunteered to be a research subject, wearing Michael Persinger’s “God helmet” to discover what so many religious people have felt.  Afterwards, he said that he was “very disappointed” by the experience, finding that the brain stimulation did not in fact create the sensation that mystics report.  This suggests that one of the most common scientific means of “explaining away” mystical experiences is not credible. In addition, assuming that some experiences are valid, God must appear to people in some way; if not through visions or voices, then through some ineffable, transient sensation as reported by mystics.  Yet, whatever sensation God chooses is bound to be affected by disorders, so that if a person has an ineffable sensation, it is likely to be diagnosed in terms of an associated disorder.  Also, even if scientists can identify how somebody might have an unusual sensation, this does not account for why they had the sensation… God could be working through physiological processes.  All of this shows that Dawkins is wrong and that examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.

    On the other hand, claimed “mystical experiences” are very diverse and vary in credibility. It is difficult to define mystical experiences so that only those that are credible are included when claiming that they should be considered valid religious experiences. For example, James argued that “higher” mystical experiences, such as should be considered as valid religious experiences, have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic. Yet, it is not clear that even the examples James appeals to have all four marks.  James uses St Teresa of Avila’s descriptions of mystical experiences to develop his argument, yet were these experiences really either passive or transient… and given the number of words she used to describe them, were they ineffable either?  Further, other scholars have defined mystical experiences differently, either more narrowly as in the definitions of Otto and Stace, or more broadly, as in the definitions of Swinburne and the Alister Hardy Centre.  The lack of a single, clear definition for mystical experiences and the inclusion of less credible experiences within some of these definitions surely undermines the case for considering them valid religious experiences.  Nevertheless, perhaps the lack of a clear definition is to be expected if mystical experiences are valid religious experiences. As James points out, language is inadequate when it comes to describing God so that scholars have sometimes resorted to the apophatic way or analogy and the use of qualifiers. Why would we expect people to be able to describe mystical experiences of God any more clearly? 

    In conclusion, examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.  While some claimed mystical experiences lack credibility and are probably not valid religious experiences, others deserve serious consideration and scientific investigation that does not begin from a fixed starting point of naïve materialism.

    [1] https://csrs.nd.edu/assets/59930/williams_1902.pdf page 325

    Secularists who say that Christianity is a source of unhappiness are wrong.  Evaluate this statement. [40]

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    Philosophical secularists such as Sigmund Freud and Richard Dawkins have often criticised Christianity for causing unhappiness.  Freud saw all religion as a “universal obsessional neurosis” which supported irrational beliefs and behaviour and created taboos which are often harmful to individuals.  While Freud admitted the usefulness of religion in “keeping down the masses” in his “Civilisation and its Discontents” (1927), Dawkins went further, claiming that religion is the “root of all evil” and the cause of multiple personal and social problems because it is anti-intellectual and as a meme corrosive to the critical faculties, particularly of the young.  Christianity, Dawkins suggests, may seem benign… but really indoctrinates people into a backward ideology which provides questionable moral guidance.  While these arguments seem persuasive and certainly highlight personal and social problems that religion in general, sometimes Christianity, might contribute towards, overall, they don’t demonstrate that Christianity causes unhappiness.  This is because people may well be happier with the crutch of an “obsessional neurosis” than without one, because the good the Church still outweighs the bad and because confronting the truth and being a critical thinker is rarely conducive to happiness!  For these reasons, secularists such as Freud and Dawkins are wrong when they say that Christianity is a source of unhappiness. 

    Firstly, Freud argued that religion causes unhappiness because it is a “universal obsessional neurosis”.  In the same way as an individual might deal with unresolved childhood trauma by channelling tension into ritualistic behaviours such as obsessional handwashing or superstitions such as saluting magpies or not treading on cracks, societies deal with trauma by channelling it into religion.  For example, in Totem and Taboo (1913) Freud claimed that the Judaeo-Christian tradition emerged as a response to an original act of patricide, a claim which he later elaborated in Moses and Monotheism (1939).  Nevertheless, Freud’s critique of religion does not claim that Christianity is always a source of unhappiness.  People may find it easier to cope when they have a ritual which they believe influences feelings and situations which they cannot otherwise control.  Societies might well function better when they are able to process their collective guilt and grief through religious myth and ritual than they would without such an opportunity.  Just because a belief or practice is irrational and/or not based on a scientific or historical truth does not mean that it necessarily makes people unhappy.  Further, influenced by Feuerbach, Freud suggested that God is subconsciously created by human beings in an act of wish-fulfilment, rather than the other way around.  Feuerbach wrote “Consciousness of God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God is self-knowledge” and Freud would certainly have agreed, judging by his “The Future of an Illusion” (1927) Nevertheless, since when did self-knowledge cause people unhappiness, especially when it results in beliefs that comfort and compensate for deficits as in this case?  Also, as Swinburne, Plantinga and Hick have pointed out, Freud can’t exclude the possibility that God might have designed us to subconsciously project God in this way.  As Alston pointed out in 1967 “Freudian theory is not logically incompatible with the truth, justifiability and value of traditional religion…”  and also, projecting God fulfils wishes and so makes people happy, not unhappy suggesting that as a secularist Freud was wrong that Christianity is a cause of unhappiness.

    Secondly, Dawkins argued that religion causes unhappiness because it is “anti-intellectual” and -acting as a meme – attacks the critical faculties, particularly of young people.  Nevertheless, Dawkins has no scientific evidence for the existence of memes in the way that he describes them, and further if they do exist in this way, by Dawkins own logic they must do so because they confer an evolutionary advantage of some sort.  The fact is that more people are affected by the religious “meme” than are not – and those who are affected seem much more likely to breed! – so there must be an evolutionary justification for religion.  Of course, Dawkins would reject the claim that human beings should follow evolutionary pressures, writing “we should not live by Darwinian principles… I am very comfortable with the idea that we can override biology with free-will…” and yet he fails to explain why people should believe the free-will to do this, when there is no evidence other than a feeling to support it, or why we should try to behave in ways that make our individual and human genes more generally less likely to be reproduced.  Further, Dawkins rejects religious belief because “how can you take someone seriously who likes to believe something because he finds it comforting?” yet this line of argument shows that religion – including Christianity – makes people happy, while also admitting that secularism does not.  It is what Dawkins calls “bracing truth” that makes people unhappy, not Christian beliefs, even if they are false.  As Dawkins himself wrote “the universe doesn’t owe is condolence or consolation; it doesn’t owe you a nice warm feeling inside…” yet for many people this is precisely what they get from religion.  While Dawkins claims that “I care passionately about the truth because it is a beautiful thing and enables us to live a better life…” he fails to justify these claims.  What is beautiful about the truth of evolution through natural selection and what helps us to live a better life about confronting our own insignificance in the meaningless infinity of the universe? This shows that the secularist Richard Dawkins was wrong in claiming that Christianity makes people unhappy. 

    Of course, Freud and Dawkins make sensible points when they argue that religion and particularly Christian beliefs make some individuals and some societies unhappy.  Freud is right that the guilt engendered by faith can be corrosive, leading to the state of “soul sickness” identified by both St Augustine and much later by William James.  Yet, religious faith, an ineffable sense of happiness and peace, hope and a second chance at purposeful living can sometimes be precipitated by such a state of despair, when it triggers a conversion experience.  St Augustine describes how he was saved by such an experience and James documented many other cases where religion – most usually Christianity – made somebody happy when no dosage of antidepressants were ever likely to work. Further, while Christianity can make individuals unhappy, social surveys have shown that on average religion makes people happier, more socially engaged, healthier and more long-lived.  As the Heritage Foundation Report (2006) states “a steadily growing body of evidence from the social sciences demonstrates that religious practice benefits individuals, families and communities, and thus the nation as a whole.”  Of course, Dawkins is right that religions can and have caused bitter wars and can and have fostered appalling abuse.  Christopher Hitchens powerfully enumerated the instances when the Roman Catholic Church alone has caused conflict and suffering.  Yet religion is also a force for good in societies, encouraging people to care for the weak and vulnerable, educate children, improve prison conditions and be more inclusive.  While it is difficult to do an objective cost-benefit analysis, Jurgen Habermas is right in highlighting that secular societies develop what he called “an awareness of what is missing” as they enter a “moral wasteland” in which society becomes “normatively mute” and where individuals lack any sense that their actions matter one way or another, as well as any hope beyond death.  Charles Taylor is right that secularism makes death into a taboo in a way that creates mental health issues, and that societies are forced to replace religious values and mores with secular equivalents – which lack the advantages of relative transparency and transcending human borders.  It follows that notwithstanding the unhappiness that religion undoubtedly causes some individuals and societies, on balance the effect of religion is to make people more rather than less happy.  As regards Christianity – given the scale of abuse and conflict that it has caused – the scales might be more even than in the case of other religions, yet the scale might well be proportionate given that Christianity is the largest world religion. Also, it is probably fair to say that if religion did not cause the abuse and the conflict, then something else would have.  Atheistic societies such as the USSR and Communist China were not marked for being inclusive and peaceful!   Human beings tend to cause abuse, conflict and unhappiness… and need little encouragement from religion to do so. 

    In conclusion, Secularists who say that Christianity is a source of unhappiness are wrong.  While Christianity and other religions undoubtedly cause some individuals unhappiness, as well as giving cover to abuse and conflict on multiple occasions, the net effect of religions is to promote human happiness, even if this might well be the result of promoting comforting delusions.  The continuing dominance of religious worldviews suggests that they offer societies an evolutionary advantage, perhaps in helping people to be satisfied with not knowing the answers to the “big questions,” and this confirms that societies are happier and function better with religions than without them.