“Scriptural Reasoning relativises religious beliefs.” Discuss [40]

Scriptural reasoning can be defined as a structured form of inter-faith engagement in which participants from different religious traditions read and discuss their sacred texts together, most commonly within Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Developed by figures such as Peter Ochs and David Ford, it aims to deepen understanding without requiring agreement or doctrinal compromise. In practice, participants engage in close reading of texts from the Torah, Bible and Qur’an, interpreting from within their own traditions. The claim that scriptural reasoning relativises religious beliefs suggests that placing competing truth claims in parallel undermines their absolute status. While this concern is reflected in magisterial texts such as Dominus Iesus, this essay will argue that scriptural reasoning does not inherently relativise belief; rather, when properly understood in light of Redemptoris Missio and Fides et Ratio, it deepens and refines religious commitment, with any relativising tendency arising from poor practice rather than the method itself.

One reason why scriptural reasoning might be seen to relativise religious beliefs is that it deliberately avoids adjudicating between competing truth claims, instead placing them alongside one another for shared exploration. This concern is strongly articulated in Dominus Iesus, issued under Pope John Paul II and largely authored by Pope Benedict XVI, which warns against a “relativistic mentality” that treats all religions as equally valid paths to truth. Building on this, Gavin D’Costa argues that practices such as scriptural reasoning risk weakening commitment to the uniqueness of Christ by encouraging believers to view their doctrines as one perspective among many. The methodological neutrality of scriptural reasoning—where no text is given priority—may symbolically reinforce this concern, particularly when passages from the Torah, Bible and Qur’an are treated as parallel sources of insight. Furthermore, the ethos of openness and hospitality, while valuable, may create subtle pressure to avoid exclusivist claims in order to preserve harmony. In this sense, scriptural reasoning could be seen to produce a form of “soft relativism,” where doctrinal distinctiveness is muted in favour of coexistence. Therefore, from this perspective, the charge that scriptural reasoning relativises religious belief appears both theologically grounded and practically plausible.

However, this critique overlooks the theological framework within which authentic interfaith engagement is intended to operate. Redemptoris Missio explicitly affirms that interreligious dialogue is “part of the Church’s evangelizing mission,” not a departure from it. For Pope John Paul II, dialogue is a means of “mutual knowledge and enrichment,” suggesting that engagement with other traditions can deepen rather than dilute Christian faith. Scriptural reasoning exemplifies this approach: participants do not abandon their truth claims but articulate them more carefully in the presence of difference. This is further supported by Fides et Ratio, which argues that truth is objective but human understanding of it is partial and historically situated. From this perspective, encountering alternative interpretations does not relativise truth but expands one’s apprehension of it. David Ford reflects this when he describes scriptural reasoning as fostering “deeper, more intelligent faith,” while Peter Ochs emphasises its role in “reparative reasoning,” strengthening traditions through engagement. Rather than producing relativism, scriptural reasoning can cultivate what might be termed “confident particularity,” where believers hold firm convictions while recognising the limits of their understanding. Consequently, when grounded in sound theology, scriptural reasoning deepens rather than relativises belief.

A further argument against the claim is that scriptural reasoning actively resists superficial harmony by foregrounding genuine disagreement. Nicholas Adams has criticised interfaith dialogue that becomes a “performance of agreement,” yet scriptural reasoning is explicitly designed to avoid this by encouraging participants to engage seriously with differences in interpretation and doctrine. This aligns with the Church of England document Sharing the Gospel of Salvation, which maintains that dialogue and proclamation are complementary rather than contradictory. In scriptural reasoning, disagreement is not a problem to be eliminated but a resource for deeper understanding. By requiring participants to explain and defend their interpretations of texts such as the Bible or Qur’an, the practice sharpens theological clarity and strengthens commitment. Moreover, this process models a form of engagement that is crucial in pluralistic societies: one in which truth claims are taken seriously without leading to conflict. Far from relativising belief, this approach may actually intensify it, as individuals become more aware of both the distinctiveness and the coherence of their own tradition. Therefore, scriptural reasoning contributes to a deeper and more resilient form of belief, undermining the relativism critique.

Nevertheless, the concern about relativism cannot be entirely dismissed, particularly in cases where scriptural reasoning is poorly implemented or detached from its theological foundations. Mohammed Arkoun has observed that interfaith initiatives are often shaped by liberal academic contexts that may implicitly favour pluralism, potentially encouraging participants to adopt a more relativistic stance. Additionally, the dominance of certain voices within dialogue—whether due to educational background or religious majority status—can distort the exchange and limit genuine engagement. In such cases, scriptural reasoning may produce only a fragile “surface cohesion,” where differences are acknowledged but not fully explored, lending some weight to the concerns raised in Dominus Iesus. However, these issues reflect failures of practice rather than inherent flaws in the method. When conducted with theological seriousness and inclusivity, scriptural reasoning aligns closely with the vision of Redemptoris Missio, in which dialogue is both truthful and transformative. The risk of relativism therefore serves as a caution, but not a decisive objection. Ultimately, it highlights the need for more rigorous and grounded forms of engagement, reinforcing rather than undermining the value of scriptural reasoning.

In conclusion, while scriptural reasoning may appear to relativise religious beliefs by placing them in dialogue without resolution, this is a superficial interpretation of a theologically rich practice. When understood in light of Redemptoris Missio and Fides et Ratio, it becomes clear that such engagement can deepen and refine belief rather than weaken it. Although concerns expressed in Dominus Iesus highlight genuine risks, these arise from poor implementation rather than the essence of the practice. The strongest argument remains that scriptural reasoning fosters a form of committed, reflective faith capable of engaging honestly with difference. In an increasingly pluralistic world, expanding such practices—while ensuring they remain theologically grounded—offers a constructive way forward, enabling believers to hold their convictions with both clarity and humility.

“Scriptural reasoning is not a useful activity.” [40]

Scriptural reasoning can be defined as a structured form of inter-faith dialogue in which participants from different religious traditions—most commonly Judaism, Christianity and Islam—read and discuss their sacred texts together. Developed in part by scholars such as Peter Ochs and David Ford, it aims not to erase doctrinal differences but to deepen understanding through shared textual engagement. Sessions typically involve close reading of passages from the Torah, Bible and Qur’an, with participants offering interpretations from within their own traditions. One example of scriptural reasoning in action can be seen in the work of the Three Faiths Forum, later the Faith and Beliefs Forum, which arranged scriptural reasoning sessions in schools. While some critics argue that scriptural reasoning is impractical, elitist, or theologically naïve, this essay will argue that it is a highly useful activity because it fosters deep mutual understanding, models constructive disagreement, and contributes meaningfully to inter-faith relations, even if its impact is sometimes limited in scope.

One major strength of scriptural reasoning is that it enables deep intellectual and relational understanding between participants, moving beyond superficial tolerance. Unlike more general interfaith dialogue, it is rooted in the authoritative texts of each tradition, allowing believers to engage from a position of authenticity. David Ford, whose Cambridge Interfaith Programme pioneered the use of Scriptural Reasoning as a central part of interfaith dialogue from 2002, describes scriptural reasoning as promoting “a wisdom-seeking conversation,” in which participants are transformed through attentive listening and interpretation. This approach avoids the pitfalls of relativism by encouraging participants to remain faithful to their own traditions while engaging seriously with others. Ford was inspired by the work of Jewish scholar Peter Ochs, who had previously emphasised that scriptural reasoning fosters “reparative reasoning,” where communities move beyond historical tensions through shared study. In practice, this can build trust and intellectual humility, as participants recognise both differences and unexpected resonances between texts. For example, discussions of themes such as hospitality or justice across the Torah, Bible and Qur’an often reveal overlapping ethical concerns while preserving doctrinal distinctiveness. This depth of engagement makes scriptural reasoning particularly useful in fostering what might be called “deep cohesion,” as opposed to mere polite coexistence. This is why Scriptural Reasoning remains central to the work of the Rose Castle Foundation which aims for peacebuilding through interfaith dialogue. Therefore, the capacity of Scriptural Reasoning to generate genuine understanding strongly supports the view that it is a valuable and effective activity.

A further reason why scriptural reasoning is useful is that it models constructive disagreement, which is essential in pluralistic societies. Rather than avoiding conflict, it creates a safe space in which differences can be explored openly and respectfully. Nicholas Adams has argued that good interfaith dialogue must resist becoming a “performance of agreement,” and scriptural reasoning does precisely this by foregrounding real theological divergence. As the guidelines publicised by Rose Castle show, participants are required to be honest and are not required to reach consensus; instead, they are encouraged to articulate and defend their interpretations while remaining open to learning from others. This process cultivates virtues such as patience, empathy and critical reflection, which are transferable beyond the immediate context of the discussion. Moreover, by demonstrating that disagreement need not lead to hostility, scriptural reasoning provides a practical model for wider society. In contexts where religious differences are often politicised or misunderstood, such practices can reduce suspicion and promote more nuanced public discourse. Also, Scriptural Reasoning can be seen as a first step, rather than the totality of inter-faith engagement. Once friendships and trust have been established through scriptural reasoning, there is a strong foundation for other projects, such as action for justice. The usefulness of scriptural reasoning, therefore, lies not only in what is learned but in how participants learn to engage—developing habits of respectful disagreement that are vital for social harmony. Consequently, it serves as both an educational and a civic resource, reinforcing its overall value.

However, critics argue that scriptural reasoning is not a useful activity because of its limited accessibility and impact. It is often confined to academic or clerical circles, raising concerns that it is an elitist exercise with little relevance to ordinary believers. Mohammed Arkoun has criticised interfaith initiatives more broadly for being dominated by intellectual elites, thereby excluding more conservative or grassroots perspectives. If scriptural reasoning primarily engages those already inclined towards dialogue, its ability to transform wider communities may be minimal. Furthermore, scholars such as Gavin D’Costa (echoing concerns articulated by Ppe John Paul II and Pope Benedict XI in Redemptoris Missio and later and even more so Dominus Iesus) argue that such practices risk encouraging a relativistic attitude to truth by placing different scriptures side by side without adjudicating between them. This could undermine doctrinal commitment and create confusion rather than clarity. Additionally, the method’s focus on Abrahamic texts raises questions about its inclusivity, as it may be less easily extended to traditions without a similar scriptural structure. These criticisms suggest that scriptural reasoning may produce, at best, a limited or “surface-level” benefit, confined to a small and unrepresentative group. However, these objections ultimately point to challenges of application rather than inherent flaws in the practice itself. As the Rose Castle Guidelines and David Ford’s original work on scriptural reasoning illustrate, Scriptural Reasoning does not require participants to abandon truth claims; rather, it encourages deeper understanding of them in relation to others. Moreover, its influence can extend beyond immediate participants through education, community leadership and institutional partnerships, gradually shaping wider attitudes. Therefore, while its reach may currently be limited, its qualitative impact remains significant, and its limitations do not negate its usefulness.

In conclusion, scriptural reasoning is indeed a useful activity, particularly in its capacity to foster deep understanding and model constructive disagreement. Its greatest strength lies in its ability to engage participants at the level of their most authoritative sources while maintaining intellectual integrity and openness. Although criticisms regarding elitism, limited scope and potential relativism are important, they do not undermine the fundamental value of the practice; rather, they highlight the need for its wider and more inclusive implementation. In an increasingly pluralistic and often polarised world, the skills and dispositions cultivated by scriptural reasoning are more necessary than ever. Expanding its use beyond academic contexts into schools, communities and religious institutions would enhance its impact, ensuring that it continues to contribute meaningfully to both inter-faith understanding and broader social cohesion.

“To what extent has inter-faith dialogue contributed positively to community cohesion” [40]

Inter-faith dialogue can be broadly defined as constructive, respectful engagement between members of different religious traditions, aimed at increasing understanding, reducing conflict and fostering cooperation. Within Christian theology, official encouragement for such dialogue can be found in Redemptoris Missio (1990), where Pope John Paul II describes dialogue as “part of the Church’s evangelizing mission,” and in the Church of England’s Sharing the Gospel of Salvation (1999), which affirms that dialogue and proclamation are not mutually exclusive but complementary. In practice, inter-faith dialogue may take structured forms such as scriptural reasoning—where Jews, Christians and Muslims read sacred texts together—or community initiatives like joint charity work and local interfaith councils. This essay will argue that inter-faith dialogue has contributed significantly and positively to community cohesion by fostering mutual understanding, reducing prejudice, and encouraging collaborative action, although its impact is sometimes limited by superficial engagement and power imbalances.

One key way in which inter-faith dialogue contributes positively to community cohesion is by breaking down ignorance and prejudice between religious groups. Misunderstanding is often at the root of social division, and dialogue creates a space in which misconceptions can be challenged. Through sustained engagement, individuals begin to see members of other religions not as abstract “others” but as neighbours with shared concerns. Theologically, this is supported by Redemptoris Missio, which states that dialogue is “a method and means of mutual knowledge and enrichment.” This suggests that dialogue is not merely polite conversation but transformative encounter. Empirically, practices like scriptural reasoning exemplify this: by reading texts together, participants gain insight into both differences and shared moral themes, fostering intellectual humility and respect. Scholars such as David Ford have argued that scriptural reasoning builds “deep mutual understanding without erasing difference,” which is crucial for genuine cohesion rather than enforced uniformity. The positive impact is clear: communities that engage in such dialogue are less likely to experience religiously motivated tension, as individuals are equipped to challenge stereotypes. Therefore, by addressing ignorance at its root, inter-faith dialogue directly strengthens the social fabric and supports the thesis that it contributes positively to cohesion.

A further strength of inter-faith dialogue lies in its ability to promote cooperative action and shared civic identity. Dialogue does not remain purely theoretical; it often leads to joint initiatives that benefit the wider community, such as food banks, disaster relief, and peacebuilding projects. This reflects the teaching in Sharing the Gospel of Salvation, which emphasises that Christians should engage with others “in service to the common good.” When religious groups collaborate in this way, they demonstrate that diversity need not lead to division but can instead enrich communal life. Sociologically, this aligns with the concept of “bridging social capital,” where connections between different groups strengthen overall societal resilience. For example, interfaith organisations in the UK, such as local councils of Christians, Jews and Muslims, have successfully addressed issues like homelessness and youth violence by pooling resources and perspectives. Such cooperation reinforces a sense of shared responsibility and belonging, key components of community cohesion. Moreover, this practical dimension of dialogue counters the criticism that religion is inherently divisive, showing instead that faith can be a unifying force. Consequently, inter-faith dialogue not only improves attitudes but also produces tangible benefits, further supporting the claim that its contribution to cohesion is substantial.

However, it can be argued that inter-faith dialogue has a limited or even counterproductive impact on community cohesion, particularly when it becomes overly idealistic, superficial, or theologically reductive. Echoing concerns articulated in Dominus Iesus—largely authored by Pope Benedict XVI— Roman Catholic Scholar Gavin D’Costa maintains that dialogue can risk collapsing genuine doctrinal differences into a form of relativism, thereby weakening the integrity of religious traditions; if participants feel pressured to minimise exclusive truth claims, this may generate distrust rather than cohesion. Similarly, David Ford’s successor as leader of the Cambridge Interfaith Programme Nicholas Adams has expressed scepticism about the way interfaith dialogue is often framed, arguing that it can become a “performance of agreement” rather than a site of genuine theological engagement. For Adams, dialogue that prioritises harmony over truth risks becoming inauthentic, as it avoids the difficult but necessary task of grappling with real disagreement. This critique is reinforced by Mohammad Arkoun’s observation that many interfaith initiatives are dominated by liberal, educated elites, leaving more conservative or marginalised voices unheard. As a result, dialogue may fail to address the very tensions it seeks to resolve, limiting its practical impact on wider community cohesion. Moreover, power imbalances between majority and minority religions and the difficulty of engaging textually with non-Abrahamic traditions can lead to tokenistic inclusion, where dialogue serves more as a symbolic gesture than a transformative process. Nevertheless, these criticisms ultimately highlight weaknesses in the implementation of inter-faith dialogue rather than in its fundamental aims. Authentic models of dialogue (such as scriptural reasoning as practiced at Rose Castle) directly address Adams’ concerns by encouraging participants to engage deeply with difference rather than avoid it. Furthermore, as David Ford has explained, the acknowledgement of disagreement—rather than its suppression—can foster a more robust and honest form of cohesion grounded in mutual respect. Therefore, while the critiques of Benedict XVI, D’Costa and Adams expose important limitations, they do not negate the overall positive contribution of inter-faith dialogue; instead, they point towards the need for more rigorous, inclusive, and theologically serious forms of engagement, thereby reinforcing the original thesis. Such critiques suggest that inter-faith dialogue may at best produce a fragile ‘surface cohesion’ based on politeness; however, this only strengthens the case for more theologically rigorous forms of dialogue capable of generating deeper, more resilient cohesion grounded in honesty.

In conclusion, inter-faith dialogue has contributed positively to community cohesion to a significant extent. Its greatest strength lies in its ability to transform relationships through understanding, as well as to inspire collaborative action for the common good. While criticisms regarding superficiality and limited reach are important, they do not undermine the core value of dialogue as a means of fostering respect and unity amidst diversity. Ultimately, in an increasingly pluralistic society, the need for meaningful engagement between religious communities is more urgent than ever. Expanding access to inter-faith initiatives and embedding dialogue in education and local governance would further enhance its impact, ensuring that community cohesion continues to grow in both depth and resilience.

“Bonhoeffer’s theology is not relevant today.” Evaluate this statement. [40]

Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a German Lutheran pastor, theologian, and anti-Nazi dissident whose writings, especially during the rise of the Third Reich, developed a radical form of Christian discipleship centered on costly grace, civil courage, and a church actively resisting injustice. Some critics argue that Bonhoeffer’s theology belongs to a specific historical moment—namely, the crisis of Nazism—and thus has little application in the context of modern secular democracies or pluralist societies. They suggest his theology is more a lesson in historical courage than an applicable guide for today’s Christian ethics. However, others contend that Bonhoeffer’s work speaks urgently to the moral crises of the 21st century: political extremism, institutional failure, and the temptation of cheap grace in modern religion. Overall, it seems that Bonhoeffer’s theology remains highly relevant today due to its enduring ethical challenge to the church and society, and its robust model of lived faith in the face of oppression.

One key reason Bonhoeffer’s theology remains relevant today is his concept of “costly grace,” which challenges modern Christianity’s drift toward comfort, consumerism, and institutional complacency. In his book The Cost of Discipleship, Bonhoeffer contrasts cheap grace—“grace without discipleship, grace without the cross”—with costly grace, which demands the full obedience and sacrifice of the believer. This theme finds resonance in contemporary criticisms of Western Christianity, which Simon Smart argues has become increasingly nominal and aligned with cultural power rather than the radical call of Jesus. Bonhoeffer’s challenge to live out one’s faith authentically, even under pressure, speaks powerfully in an age of religious indifference and moral compromise. The increasing popularity of Bonhoeffer among young evangelicals and progressive Christians alike demonstrates that his theology continues to inspire calls for social justice, humility, and discipleship in a world hungry for authentic faith. Thus, Bonhoeffer’s ethical critique remains a vital counterpoint to the modern church’s tendency to mirror culture rather than transform it.

In addition, Bonhoeffer’s views on civil courage and responsible action are especially relevant in today’s world of political polarization and moral relativism. His involvement in the Confessing Church and ultimately in the resistance against Hitler—including his role in the plot to assassinate the Führer—embodies a theology that refuses to separate belief from action. Eric Metaxas, in his biography Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy, argues that Bonhoeffer offers a model for confronting evil not only through personal piety but through concrete, sacrificial action. This is increasingly pertinent as Christians today face questions about how to respond to authoritarianism, systemic injustice, and human rights abuses across the globe. Bonhoeffer’s notion of “religionless Christianity,” developed in his Letters and Papers from Prison, also anticipates the modern challenge of faith in a secular age. His call to follow Christ outside the bounds of institutional religion—”to speak of God in a secular way”—offers a fresh paradigm for mission and witness in post-Christian societies. Therefore, Bonhoeffer’s legacy as a theologian of action is not just historically important but morally indispensable in our current moment.

Nevertheless, some scholars argue that Bonhoeffer’s theology was so context-specific—shaped by Nazi totalitarianism and Lutheran ecclesiology—that it lacks broad applicability today. Critics like John A. Phillips suggest that Bonhoeffer’s radicalism is more about ethical witness in extreme circumstances than about shaping theology for ordinary believers in peaceful societies. Moreover, some claim that Bonhoeffer’s ambiguous use of terms like “religionless Christianity” is too vague to provide concrete guidance for church practice today. However, this view underestimates both the adaptability and prophetic force of Bonhoeffer’s thought. As Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells argue, Bonhoeffer’s idea of living “before God and with God” in a world come of age speaks directly to modern dilemmas where institutional religion is distrusted but spiritual hunger remains. Moreover, the fact that theologians and ethicists across ideological spectra—from liberation theologians in Latin America to post-evangelicals in the West—continue to engage Bonhoeffer’s work suggests that his theology has escaped its original context. Bonhoeffer’s relevance lies precisely in his ability to draw connections between theology, ethics, and public responsibility in a way that continues to challenge Christians across times and cultures.

In conclusion, Bonhoeffer’s theology is indeed relevant today, primarily because it offers a compelling model of Christian faith that integrates costly discipleship with moral courage and social responsibility. In a world marked by moral compromise, cultural Christianity, and political apathy, Bonhoeffer’s radical vision of following Christ “unto death” challenges both individuals and institutions to re-examine what authentic faith looks like. As contemporary Christians navigate complex ethical landscapes—from authoritarianism to social injustice to religious irrelevance—Bonhoeffer’s writings offer enduring wisdom and a prophetic voice. The call now is not simply to admire his courage from a distance but to live out his theology of active discipleship in our own contexts. Churches, theologians, and individual believers must heed Bonhoeffer’s call to live responsibly, faithfully, and courageously in the world, even—perhaps especially—when it costs us everything.

“Jesus is best understood as a teacher of wisdom.” Discuss [40]

There is a long tradition of interpreting Jesus as a teacher of wisdom rather than as God incarnate. Immanuel Kant admired Jesus as a moral teacher whose ethical wisdom provided a universal guide for human behaviour. Nevertheless, in recent times this argument is commonly associated with John Dominic Crossan, who argues that Jesus should be understood within the Jewish wisdom tradition, presenting him as a Jewish sage whose teaching resembled the wisdom literature of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes more than later Christian doctrinal claims about incarnation. Wisdom teaching in Judaism was characterised by memorable sayings, imagery, metaphor, parallelism and practical ethical instruction aimed at showing people how to live in right relationship with God and others. This can clearly be seen in Jesus’ teaching in Matthew 5 and in parables such as the Lost Son. By contrast, N. T. Wright and more traditional theologians such as Barth and Bonhoeffer argue that Jesus cannot merely be reduced to a wisdom teacher because he understood himself as the unique Son of God and fulfilment of Israel’s hopes. Nevertheless, while divine claims became central to later Christian theology, the Gospel evidence suggests that Jesus’ historical ministry is best understood primarily through the wisdom tradition, since his teaching methods, themes and ethical concerns consistently reflect the hallmarks of Jewish wisdom instruction.

One reason for accepting Crossan’s interpretation of Jesus as a teacher of wisdom is that Jesus’ style of teaching strongly reflects the literary and rhetorical characteristics of Jewish wisdom literature. Wisdom teachers commonly used imagery, metaphor, aphorisms, opposites and parallelism to provoke reflection and communicate moral truths memorably. This style dominates Jesus’ teaching, especially in Matthew 5. The Beatitudes use parallelism repeatedly: “Blessed are the poor in spirit… Blessed are those who mourn… Blessed are the meek.” The repeated structure gives the teaching rhythm and authority while emphasising key moral attitudes. Furthermore, Jesus uses opposites and paradoxes characteristic of wisdom literature, teaching that those who appear weak or suffering will ultimately inherit the kingdom. This reflects the wisdom theme that present circumstances are temporary and will eventually be reversed by God. Crossan argues that Jesus’ sayings deliberately challenged conventional assumptions about honour, wealth and status in first-century society. The aphoristic style of sayings such as “the first shall be last and the last first” resembles Proverbs because it condenses profound insight into memorable phrases. Jesus also constantly used imagery and metaphor, describing his followers as “salt of the earth” and “light of the world.” These vivid images function pedagogically, helping listeners apply spiritual truths to ordinary life. Crossan drew heavily on the work of EP Sanders, who argued that Jesus should primarily be understood in relation to his 1st Century Jewish context. For Sanders, Jesus’ teaching methods were unmistakeably rabbinic and are in complete continuity with earlier Jewish wisdom traditions. For example, the Sermon on the Mount is didactic in tone. Jesus is instructing people about how to live rather than presenting systematic theology about his divine identity and uses aphorisms, parallelism, opposites and the fear of the Lord theme repeatedly. The evangelists focus on recording Jesus’ teachings rather than explaining metaphysical doctrines like the Trinity, which don’t really develop until centuries later, supporting the view that high Christology was a later exaggeration and not rooted in the reality of Jesus’ life. So, overall, the literary style of Jesus’ teaching strongly support the claim that he is best understood as a teacher of wisdom.

A second reason supporting Crossan’s view is that the themes of Jesus’ teaching closely mirror central themes within Jewish wisdom traditions. Wisdom literature, such as in the Old Testament books of Ecclesiastes and Job, teaches that earthly suffering is temporary, that fortunes will ultimately be reversed and that people should trust in God even when life appears unjust or confusing. These themes are especially clear in Matthew 5 and in the Parable of the Lost Son. In the Beatitudes, Jesus repeatedly promises future blessing to those who currently suffer: “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be filled.” This reflects the wisdom belief that God’s justice may not be immediately visible but will ultimately prevail. Further, the “fear of the Lord” theme, central to Jewish wisdom, is also reflected in Jesus’ insistence that righteousness should exceed external legal obedience and emerge from sincere reverence for God. For example, Jesus uses parallelism to drive home the point that it is better to lose an eye or a hand than to lose the whole body in the fires of hell. The Parable of the Lost Son similarly expresses wisdom themes through narrative form. Jesus teaches that true wisdom involves humility, mercy and dependence upon God rather than worldly success. The younger son experiences suffering and alienation because of foolish choices, yet restoration becomes possible through repentance and reconciliation. The father’s response teaches wisdom about forgiveness, compassion and grace, while the older brother represents the danger of self-righteousness. Crossan argues that Jesus used parables not simply as illustrations but as wisdom stories designed to subvert conventional thinking and force listeners to reconsider their assumptions. Crossan agrees with the scepticism about miracle stories that can be traced way back into the early 19th Century writings of David Strauss and perhaps beyond into the thought of Immanuel Kant. If miraculous elements were later theological additions, the enduring historical core of Jesus’ ministry becomes his wisdom teaching. This also explains why Jesus’ teachings remain morally and spiritually influential even beyond Christianity. Therefore, the themes of Jesus’ teaching reinforce the claim that he is best understood as a teacher of wisdom.

However, critics argue that Jesus should not merely be understood as a wisdom teacher because the New Testament presents him as uniquely divine. N. T. Wright for one example argues that Jesus consciously saw himself as inaugurating God’s kingdom and fulfilling Israel’s messianic expectations in an unprecedented way. Wright points to Jesus forgiving sins and speaking with personal authority as evidence that he claimed more than the role of a teacher. Barth similarly rejected liberal attempts to reduce Jesus to ethics, insisting that Christianity is grounded in divine revelation rather than human wisdom. Bonhoeffer criticised portrayals of Jesus as merely a moral guide because they ignore the radical demands of discipleship rooted in Christ’s divine authority. C. S. Lewis’ famous “Lord, liar or lunatic” argument claims that Jesus’ extraordinary claims prevent him from being understood simply as a wise teacher. Furthermore, Kähler and Bauer criticised the “quest for the historical Jesus,” arguing that scholars such as Crossan reconstruct Jesus according to modern assumptions while neglecting the Christ of faith proclaimed by the Church. However, these criticisms are less persuasive because they often prioritise later theological interpretation over the actual content of Jesus’ ministry in the Gospels. Even if Jesus was eventually understood as divine, the gospels show that his day-to-day activity overwhelmingly involved teaching through wisdom forms such as parables, aphorisms and ethical instruction. Lewis’ trilemma assumes that every Gospel saying directly reflects Jesus’ own self-understanding without recognising the role of later theological development. Moreover, divine identity and wisdom teaching are not mutually exclusive; Jesus may have been seen as extraordinary precisely because of the authority and originality of his wisdom. The centrality of Matthew 5 and the parables demonstrates that what most distinguished Jesus publicly was his teaching rather than doctrinal claims about incarnation. John Hick supported the view that Jesus’ significance lies primarily in his spiritual insight and ethical vision rather than supernatural status. As he saw it, the incarnation is a metaphor, and Jesus was not the unique son of God. This interpretation of Jesus’ identity allowed Hick to embrace Pluralism and a belief in Universalism also, showing how seeing Jesus as a teacher of wisdom supports a more inclusive and progressive theology fit for the 21st century.  Further, feminist writer Rosemary Radford Ruether also situated Jesus within the Jewish Wisdom tradition, presenting him as embodying the feminine divine wisdom principle (Sophia) and so offering teaching that is liberating and compassionate to women as well as men. This shows that not only does the style and do the themes of Jesus teaching show that he is best understood as a teacher in the wisdom tradition, but also that this interpretation is best for those seeking a more progressive approach to Christian theology today.

In conclusion, Jesus is best understood as a teacher of wisdom because both the style and themes of his ministry place him firmly within the Jewish wisdom tradition. Scholars such as Crossan, Sanders and Hick convincingly demonstrate that Jesus’ enduring significance lies in the transformative ethical wisdom of his teaching rather than later doctrinal claims about his divine nature. Although Wright, Barth and Bonhoeffer rightly emphasise the importance of Christological belief within Christianity, the historical evidence still suggests that Jesus’ primary role was that of a wisdom teacher. Further, as Hick and Ruether show, embracing a lower Christology has far wider implications for Christianity in the modern world than it might at first appear. Modern readers should therefore engage seriously with Jesus’ teachings as a profound source of ethical and spiritual wisdom capable of challenging assumptions about justice, humility and compassion in contemporary society.

The Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. Discuss [40]

Protestant Christians have faith “Sola Scriptura”, seeing Christian Ethics as Theonomous and based only on God’s commands… usually as found in Scripture, which is understood to be the Words of God and Inerrant. Despite this, relatively few Protestants would accept that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide because there are some subjects on which the Bible says nothing (such as Abortion, IVF, Assisted Dying) and because even where the Bible does speak, what is said is in need of interpretation. As a result, the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide.

Firstly, even Karl Barth rejected the claim that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. Barth criticised both Natural Theology and Natural Law, the Roman Catholic claim that we can discover most of what is right and wrong using reason, because he believed that this has been corrupted by the Fall. Drawing on the writings of St Paul and St Augustine, Barth argued that we are saved by grace and faith and not because of anything we have done (Ephesians 2:8), suggesting that we can’t discover God’s existence or nature using reason and neither can we discover right and wrong, let alone use this knowledge to earn our own salvation by works (the Pelagian heresy). For Barth, knowledge of God and what is good must be revealed and this revelation is for most people through Scripture. Yet Barth also criticised the view that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. This is because Scripture is not itself God’s revelation, but rather witness to God’s revelation through Jesus and the Prophets. Being only a record of what was revealed, rather than revelation, it should be seen as a human creation and subject to some errors and omissions, however minor. For Barth, as for Bonhoeffer, Christians should reflect on their reading of Scripture as a whole and on the example of Jesus when making moral decisions autonomously and personally, rather than trying to follow lines of the Bible individually on face value. Today, scholars such as NT Wright and Peter Enns agree with Barth’s approach to Biblical Ethics. For NT Wright, the narrative or story of the Bible is true and inerrant, but the idea that isolated parts can be taken literally out of context and without proper interpretation is mistaken. Similarly, Enns points out that the Bible is a human creation which reflects its cultural contexts and authors’ perspectives. Surely, God speaks through scripture, but it should not be understood as a transcript of God’s words, let alone as a comprehensive guide to God’s thinking on moral issues. Biblical Criticism supports the approach to Scripture taken by Barth, Wright and Enns. Textual analysis has shown that the Bible was written by multiple authors and repeatedly redacted, as well as that the historical, political and theological concerns of the authors and redactors are reflected in the text. Given this, as well as the existence of multiple translations and editions of the Bible, it is hard to see that it is intellectually credible to argue that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide.

In addition, the Roman Catholic Church, while upholding the principle of Biblical Inerrancy, dismisses the idea that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. For Roman Catholics, Scripture is one source of moral authority among others, including Tradition and Reason (Natural Law). As Aquinas pointed out, Scripture needs to be read as a whole and through “the lens of doctrine” or it can seem to give guidance that contradicts reason and/or Christian tradition. For example, in Romans 2:6 the Bible says “God will repay each one according to his deeds.” and of course Matthew 25 says much the same thing through the Parable of the Sheep and Goats, while the Bible also says that people are saved by Grace and Faith and not because of anything they have done in Ephesians 2:8-9. This seems contradictory and could lead an individual Protestant who reads the Bible to believe that they are saved because of good works and perhaps that anybody who does good works will be saved, while this contradicts Christian tradition which is clearly Sola Gratia and exclusivist. Roman Catholics point out that following Church Teachings, which are informed by Tradition and Reason as well as Scripture, which itself is interpreted “through the lens of doctrine” and as a whole rather than in isolated parts, guards against being led into error in this way. Of course, evangelical Protestants will reject this argument that Christian Ethics should be Heteronomous, reasoning that the Bible itself says that the Holy Spirit will guide those who God has saved to the truth, so they do not misunderstand God’s will when reading Scripture. “But when he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will guide you into all the truth.” John 16:13 Yet Roman Catholics would reject this and say that this is a very particular interpretation of this passage and does not explain how faithful Christians can read Scripture and end up with multiple interpretations of what it says. If having the “right interpretation” depends on having been saved and having “wrong interpretations” is symptomatic of having not received God’s Grace and Spirit, then when multiple interpretations exist amongst God’s fearing and good people – as is evidenced by the multiplicity of Protestant denominations for example – how is anybody to know what the “right interpretation” and God’s law is? The result of arguing that Scripture is a comprehensive moral guide is to leave Christian Ethics up to the consciences of individuals, giving them license to believe that anything that they feel led to believe is what God commands. This is not a practical approach to Christian Ethics. The Yorkshire Ripper Peter Sutcliffe believed that he was led by God to murder women, quoting his readings of scripture to justify his heinous crimes… can anybody really say that he should have listened to his conscience and that he was right to do so when it led him to break God’s sixth Commandment (Exodus 20:13) as well as the whole of Christian tradition and reason? While Acts 5:29 does say “we must obey God rather than human beings”, suggesting that doing what is right may well break social norms and even religious teachings, the argument that Christian Ethics consists in following one’s personal “conscience” wherever it leads, provided that these leadings were inspired by one’s reading of the Bible in some way (however idiosyncratic or irrational), is difficult to defend. This suggests that the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide.

On the other hand, the Bible itself suggests that it is a comprehensive moral guide – at least in parts – so Protestants who have faith Sola Scriptura and uphold Biblical Inerrancy may feel bound to accept that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. St Paul wrote that “all scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching… so that the servant of God may be thoroughly equipped for every good work…” 2 Timothy 3:16-17; this implies that the Bible is a complete moral handbook for Christians. On the other hand, Roman Catholics have pointed out that this quotation is taken out of context, ignoring the preceding sentence “continue in what you have learned and have become convinced of, because you know those from whom you learned it” 2 Timothy 3:14, which suggests that there are sources of authority besides the Bible. Further, there are other passages in the Bible which suggest that there are moral authorities outside of Scripture. Romans 13:1 affirms “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.” suggesting that Christians should obey those who have power and worldly authority as well as the “plain word of Scripture”. This is confirmed by Hebrews 13:17. Further, the Bible also says that ignorant people can misinterpret Scripture, suggesting that Luther was wrong to suggest that “A simple layman armed with Scripture is to be believed above a pope or a cardinal without it.” St Peter wrote of St Paul’s letters – amongst which 2 Timothy purports to be – that “His letters contain some things that are hard to understand, which ignorant and unstable people distort, as they do the other Scriptures, to their own destruction.” 2 Peter 3:16, suggesting that it is possible for people to be misled by the word of Scripture and that additional education may be necessary to understand its true meaning. In this way, the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on the authority of Scripture – that it must be acknowledged as “teaching solidly, faithfully and without error that truth which God wanted put into sacred writings for the sake of salvation.” Dei Verbum but that the Church holds the authority to interpret it, to discover and communicate that truth to ordinary people, handed down from St Peter who received it from Jesus (Matthew 18:18) – is more persuasive than the minority Protestant view that Scripture is a comprehensive moral guide. Further, using the inerrancy of the Bible to justify having faith in the inerrancy and completeness of the Bible is a circular argument which as such is unconvincing. Nevertheless, Evangelical Protestants such as RC Sproul, JI Packer and more recently Wayne Grudem have argued that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. They stress Biblical Inerrancy, arguing that faith in God means faith in God’s word in scripture. If one doubts the Bible and its teaching in any part, it is the same as doubting God’s authority and not consistent with being a Christian. St Augustine made this point, as did Harold Lindsell in “The Battle for the Bible”, published in 1978, the same year that many Protestant leaders signed up to the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy. Yet, despite signing the Chicago Statement on inerrancy, even Evangelical scholars like Wayne Grudem stop short of claiming that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide today, because the Bible does not address many contemporary moral issues. He wrote “the Bible always tells the truth, and it always tells the truth concerning everything that it talks about.” This suggests that there may be things that the Bible does not talk about, about which it does not tell the truth, and so that the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide.

In conclusion, the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide. This is accepted by Protestant authorities such as Karl Barth as well as by the Roman Catholic Church and is supported by reason, evidence and even some parts of the Bible itself. Even those few evangelical protestant scholars who seem to support this claim stop short of actually endorsing the idea that the Bible is a comprehensive or complete guide when it comes to modern moral issues.

“The word conscience is best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.” Discuss (40)

We use the word “conscience” every day, but rarely stop to think about what it really means.  In broad terms, it usually refers to our inner moral compass, yet it can also refer to the voice of God within us, reason, how we apply our moral principles, our moral framework or even the internalised voices of our parents within our subconscious mind. Because of this, and because the arguments of those who have attempted to define the conscience as a specific thing are not persuasive, it is best to understand conscience as an umbrella term for various factors in moral decision-making.

Firstly, in the Bible various different words are used to refer to and sometimes translated as conscience.  In the Old Testament, the Hebrew word “lev” for heart suggests that there is an inner moral guide.  For example, “David’s heart condemned him after he had numbered the people. So David said to the LORD “I have sinned greatly in what I have done…” 2 Samuel 24:10 It was not until the rabbinic period that the Hebrew word matzpun referred to conscience. Etymologically it means “hidden north”, giving the suggestion of an inner moral compass. In the New Testament the Greek word syneídēsis means the capacity to apply general principles of moral judgment to particular cases.  The word is used frequently by St Paul, for example in Romans Chapter 2 “when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them.” After the 4th Century AD the Greek word Synderesis / Synteresis started to be used in commentaries on both Old and New Testaments. The word synderesis is by most scholars reckoned to be a corruption of the Greek word syneidêsis (συνείδησις).  On the other hand, also in the New Testament, St Paul speaks of those whose consciences have become “seared with a hot iron,” 1 Timothy 4:2 meaning they no longer feel guilt for sin. Conversely, a “good” or “clear” conscience is seen as one that is aligned with God’s will (1 Timothy 1:5). In 1 Peter 3:16, Peter encourages Christians to maintain a clear conscience, so that they may stand firm in their faith and defend it with integrity when challenged. These references suggest that conscience is a distinct faculty that all human beings have.  Given that the Bible uses different words for conscience and implies that it is God’s law, an inner moral guide or compass, the capacity to apply general principles to specific cases, our moral character and a faculty which can be corrupted, it seems that the word conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

Secondly, following the Bible, different Christian scholars have used the word conscience to refer to different things. For example, Aquinas uses three different words to distinguish between three things people usually use the word conscience for; Ratio, Synderesis and Conscientia.  For Aquinas, the God-given and rational part of conscience is called RATIO, it commands us to pursue good and avoid evil and cannot be wrong. For Kant, this is reason itself, issuing us with Categorical Imperatives which we must choose to follow.  For St Augustine, Butler and Newman this is conscience as the “voice of God” speaking through our minds and calling us to do what is right, which they admit is not always the same as what is rational. For Aquinas also, the conscience is not a synonym for reason but also refers to a specific habit of reason that tries to work out what good and evil consist in. This practical part of reason (what Aristotle called Phronesis) is known as SYNDERESIS and it requires formation, moving from offering only the most general guidance towards being more and more specific.  While it is a duty to follow the guidance of synderesis, which is after all part of Ratio which cannot be wrong, because its guidance may be too general to be useful it might mislead us, such as leading us to pursue an apparent good and not a real good. In addition, for Aquinas, another part of conscience is CONSCIENTIA, the act of applying synderesis-guidance to specific situations.  This is what Fletcher refers to as conscience, defining it as a verb not a noun.  This shows that scholars use the word conscience to refer to the faculty of reason, the voice of God, the habit of practical reason and the act of applying moral rules to a specific situation… and that conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

Thirdly, psychologists have a variety of ideas about what the conscience consists in, that are independent of the Bible and based on scientific observations. While his methodology was criticised by Popper as pseudo-scientific, Freud saw conscience as part of the super-ego, part of the subconscious mind that represents internalised voices of our parents, societal norms, religious beliefs and moral ideals. Conscience is formed during early childhood, particularly through the oral, anal and phallic phases of psycho-sexual development, suggesting that while conscience is a specific part of the psyche, it is made up of the values of our parents or care-givers as influenced by repressed experiences in different ways, explaining why peoples’ consciences seem to guide them in different directions that are not always rational or consistent with prevailing social norms. Freud’s ideas influenced other psychologists, whose methodologies are more credible, again seeking to explain how consciences develop through childhood and differ between adults.  For Piaget, consciences develop from being heteronomous in early childhood to being autonomous during the teenage years, and developmental disorders therefore explain why some adults lack a moral conscience, why others have a strong sense of the conscience being like a moral compass pointing towards fixed rules and still others see it as a more flexible and situational process of decision-making.  Similarly, for Fromm conscience usually develops from being authoritarian into being more humanistic, but some people fail to develop leaving them with an authoritarian conscience into adulthood and conforming to rules imposed on them from outside without really engaging reason. This explains how totalitarian regimes sometimes succeed, and why there will always be those who oppose them on humanistic grounds.  Finally, Kohlberg built on the ideas of Piaget and Fromm to suggest that conscience continues to develop in adulthood for some, towards a post-conventional level which at Stage 6 involves the conscience being reason, applying universal moral rules. Kohlberg explains why some peoples’ consciences demand that they follow rational deontological ethics, while others suggest they should be more situational and relativistic in their decision-making while others still command them to conform with social norms. While Freud, Piaget, Fromm and Kohlberg suggest that there is a specific thing called the conscience, they stress how it develops and changes, giving guidance of different sorts.  They also have slightly different ideas of conscience from each other.  This also suggests that conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

In conclusion, the word conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making. From a Christian perspective, Friedrich Schleiermacher, a German theologian and philosopher, agreed with this, viewing conscience as an umbrella term that integrates various factors of moral self-awareness. From a social-scientific perspective Carol Gilligan (b.1936) in “A Different Voice” (1982) argued that conscience is an umbrella term that includes different moral orientations depending on one’s ethical approach (e.g., care ethics versus justice ethics). She suggested that the conscience is influenced by not just reasoning, but also empathy, relational dynamics, and the emotional ties that influence moral judgment.  Whether one is approaching conscience from a religious or non-religious perspective, seeing it as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making is the most credible approach.

Assess the claim that love (agape) is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics. [40]

In John Chapter 13 Jesus taught his disciples “A new command I give you: Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another.  By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another.”  The Greek word translated “love” in this passage is agape, which refers to the non-preferential humanitarian love that Jesus showed to people rather than the erotic eros or the friendly philos.  This is why some Christians regard agape-love as the only source of Christian ethics, because it was Jesus’ single new commandment and, of course, Jesus was God. Nevertheless, today few Christians agree with this, given that Roman Catholics follow heteronomous ethics and most Protestants a broader Divine Command ethic based on the whole Bible.  It follows that agape is not sufficient as the only source of Christian ethics.

Firstly, while John 13 does state that agape-love is the one commandment by which Christians will be known as Jesus’ disciples, Jesus said this in context.  In Jeremiah 31:33 God promised that “This is the covenant I will make with the people of Israel after that time,” declares the LORD. “I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts. I will be their God, and they will be my people.” This suggests that Jesus was referring to the new covenant when he gave the commandment of agape-love, and meaning that Christians would follow all God’s law automatically in both letter and spirit, rather than that they would abandon the rest of the commandments and do whatever they felt was loving instead.  This interpretation is consistent with Matthew 5:18 “For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished…” and with the rest of Jesus ethical teaching, which is more demanding than the Law of Moses and not less.  For example, in Matthew 5 teaches that Jesus equated anger with murder and lustful looks with adultery.  While Jesus was demanding that Christians should act with agape – treating others as they would wish to be treated and not only following the letter of the law – there is no sense that agape is an alternative source of ethics to the rest of God’s commandments.   The point is that a person acting with agape would neither be angry with somebody nor murder them, neither look lustfully at a woman nor commit adultery with her.  In this way it would be wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics.

Secondly, for Roman Catholics seeing agape-love as a sufficient basis for Christian Ethics ignores the importance of a well-formed conscience as well as of Scripture, Tradition and Reason (Natural Law) in shaping Christian teaching. Following St Thomas Aquinas’ reasoning, the Catechism affirms that the primary source of Christian ethics is the conscience.  When we face a difficult choice, it is a moral duty to follow conscience.  Our conscientia is that part of our practical reason that applies the general principles of Christian Ethics that we know through synderesis (principles which are consistent with Scripture, Tradition and Natural Law) to the specific situation at hand.  Nevertheless, because consciences can err, leading us to pursue apparent and not real goods, and because synderesis is a habit that needs to be developed, we must take care that consciences are properly formed through a Catholic education.  Church teachings, which underpin Catholic education, provide a short-cut to the decisions that a well-formed conscience would make and when the conscience diverges from Catholic teachings it is a good indication that the conscience is erring.  Pope Pius XII rejected situation ethics in 1952, even before its more agapeistic versions were developed by Joseph Fletcher and JAT Robinson, because while it is consistent with the Roman Catholic understanding of Christian ethics in encouraging Christians to act in conscience, because it ignores the need to form consciences or ensure that their decisions are consistent with Scripture, Tradition and Reason, it leaves individuals vulnerable and without proper moral guidance when they face difficult situations. Fletcher’s claim that there should be no absolutes in Christian ethics, no always and no nevers, conflicts with the Bible’s long list of prescriptive commandments and suggests that agape is instead of the law rather than a fulfilment of it, as Jesus taught.  It is also difficult to define agape-love.  For example, Immanuel Kant argued that human beings are “pathologically loving” and that an action motivated by this love always treat human beings as ends in themselves and never as mere means.  By contrast, Fletcher defends what he calls the agapeic calculus, the greatest amount of neighbour-welfare for the largest number of neighbours possible, making agapeistic ethics seem much like utilitarianism.  While by Kant’s definition, agape could never justify involuntary abortion, suicide or adultery… but Fletcher freely discusses situations in which these would, he implies, be the most loving course of action. Because of this central confusion, it is difficult for people not to confuse a genuinely agapeistic motivation with a more preferential or even selfish motivation. All this shows that it is wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics.

On the other hand, it is true that Jesus sometimes seemed to break the laws of Moses situationally, for the benefit of people. According to Mark’s Gospel, He healed on the Sabbath and allowed his disciples to pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, neither of which in life-threatening situations. It seems that Jesus was maximising peoples’ welfare and putting this ahead of obedience to the law, as Fletcher suggested.  Nevertheless, the laws concerning the Sabbath were, Jesus reasoned, there to serve man and therefore could and should be broken when they harm peoples’ welfare.  The same might not be true of other laws, such as the prohibition on murder in Exodus 20:13.  In Genesis 4 God says that Abel’s blood cries out to him from the ground and in Genesis 9 God demands an accounting for any human blood that is shed.  This might suggest that the law against murder is not only to serve humans, but also to serve God because God has an interest in human blood.  As St Paul confirms in 1 Corinthians 6:19-20 “Do you not know that your bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore honour God with your bodies.” Which implies that human life is sacred and owned by God, so murder offends against God and not only human beings.  If this is true, then it would be impossible to act out of agape-love and kill a human being, even in situations as extreme as outlined by Fletcher, because agape puts love of God first and ahead of love of neighbour, according to Mark 12:28-32. Kant would be right that agape always treats humanity as an end and never as a means to an end, even of maximising human welfare. This suggests that agape-love is not sufficient as a source of Christian ethics, unless one specifies that it includes love of God as well as and ahead of love of neighbour, which would bring following all of God’s commandments into the scope of agape, rather than accepting God’s laws only selectively. This interpretation would be consistent with a more mainstream Protestant Ethic, which aims to follow all those Divine Commands in spirit at least. 

In conclusion, it is wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethic unless one is very specific in defining agape, stipulating that it includes love of God as well as and ahead of love of neighbour, so leads to a broader biblical ethic which always upholds the sanctity of human life.  Certainly, it is wrong to say that situation ethics is the only or even an acceptable Christian Ethic.

The five primary precepts are the most important part of natural law. Discuss [40]

St Thomas Aquinas explained his theory of natural law, which shares many characteristics with other versions of natural law, in Summa 2i. 94.2.  He explained how natural laws are discoverable through RATIO, the human intellect, which is made up of SPECULATIVE REASON and PRACTICAL REASON.  Speculative reason reveals abstract notions and principles, such as “good is that which all things seek after,” then practical reason applies these to real life, developing moral precepts for us to follow.  For example, “this is the first precept of [natural] law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” Aquinas goes on to explain how “all other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.” He elaborated on the precepts of natural law, listing and explaining primary and secondary precepts, explaining how “Since… good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.” Primary precepts are thus established as “objects of pursuit” or prescriptions and secondary precepts as “objects of avoidance” or prohibitions.  For examples, “whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law…” meaning that the preservation of human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept. Aquinas also lists as primary precepts sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God and shunning ignorance as well as living in society, avoiding offending those amongst whom one must live.  Overall, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law.

    Firstly, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law because they are derived from the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided”, and different scholars have derived different lists of primary precepts, which have gone on to produce different lists of secondary precepts and disagreements in how natural law guides people in practical situations. Aquinas discussed whether or not his list of primary precepts was infallible in Summa 2i. 94. 2 and concluded that the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided” is infallible, because it is so closely related to the Primary Principle of speculative reason “good is that which all things seek after” and because speculative reason cannot be wrong, its objects being necessary truths.  Nevertheless, the primary precepts of the preservation of human life, sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God, shunning ignorance and living in society are known through synderesis, which must develop its understanding of these precepts as it is formed.  While nothing the synderesis suggests can be wrong, the list of primary precepts it provides might be incomplete, which explains why some societies seem unaware of some basic human goods.  Aquinas explains how it is possible to be unaware that living in society and avoiding offending neighbours is a primary precept, “thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).”  This would explain why later versions of natural law have listed the primary precepts differently, and particularly why some have added to Aquinas’ five.  For example, John Finnis lists seven basic human goods, including play and aesthetic experience.  This could be because Finnis’ synderesis has developed further than Aquinas’ did, coming to recognise the essential importance of fun and beauty to human flourishing in a way that Aquinas never did.  It follows that the fact that the list of five primary precepts provided by Aquinas, and indeed other lists in other versions of Natural Law, differ and might be incomplete suggests that they cannot be the most important part of natural law.

    Secondly, the primary precepts are general injunctions and need to be translated into secondary precepts in order to provide useful moral guidance. Whereas the primary precepts are positive, secondary precepts are negative and tell people what they must not do.  For example, preserve human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept.  Yet there are often multiple secondary precepts derived from each primary precept.  For example, the primary precept of living in society would lead to a huge number of secondary prohibitions, ranging from do not steal to do not lie to do not be jealous or aggressive… It follows that the majority of moral rules that people live by in practice are secondary and not primary precepts, suggesting that the secondary precepts are more important than the primary precepts.  Of course, secondary precepts are all derived from the primary precepts, so could not exist without the primary precepts and would differ if the primary precepts differed.  This might suggest that the primary precepts are more important than the secondary precepts, and yet for most people their moral awareness begins with the conscientia speaking against certain actions in a negative way, such as by warning people not to cheat or deceive.  Although it is true that the conscientia does this because it is seeking to apply the primary precepts to specific situations, in practice people are usually aware of the secondary precepts before or even without being aware of the primary precepts, which suggests that in fact the secondary precepts are more important.

    On the other hand, Proportionalists like Bernard Hoose would argue that the primary precepts of Natural Law are more important than the secondary precepts because there are sometimes proportional justifications for breaking secondary precepts, but never for breaking primary precepts.  For example, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to the secondary precept, don’t run inside… because running causes accidents and people might get hurt… but in the case of an explosion it might be proportionally justified to run, risking accidents, when this is the only way to save lives. Similarly, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to a secondary prohibition against abortion, but in the case of an ectopic pregnancy where inaction would lead to the death of both mother and child, it might be proportionally justified to abort in order to preserve the maximum number of human lives. Hoose points out that even Aquinas uses proportional reasoning to justify war, capital punishment and even the toleration of prostitution… so surely this suggests that primary precepts are more important than secondary precepts, given that secondary precepts can be broken in the pursuit of good, but not primary precepts.  Nevertheless, while Hoose is right that proportional reasoning in the writing of Aquinas and later scholars suggests that secondary precepts are less important than primary precepts, proportionalism has been condemned by the Roman Catholic Church, the main adopter of Natural Law.  The Church sees proportionalism as a slippery slope towards situation ethics, utilitarianism and antinomianism in ethics. Instead, the Church has chosen to adopt a Heteronomous Ethic, with the Magisterium using Natural Law alongside Scripture and Tradition to develop Church Teachings which are Secondary Precepts.  These are then used as the basis for encyclicals, Catholic instruction and advice as well as for formation. It follows that for ordinary Roman Catholics secondary precepts are more important than Primary Precepts, because they are encouraged to follow Church Teaching rather than to try to develop it!  While the Church accepts Aquinas’ teaching about conscience, it emphasises the importance of formation so that the Synderesis and Conscientia guide Catholics to follow Church teaching in all matters, rather than really to think for themselves.  This suggests that in practice secondary precepts are in fact more important than primary principles, even though this might not be true to Aquinas’ intention.

    In conclusion, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law. As has been established, the list of five primary precepts might be incomplete and is certainly disputed, while also depending on the key precept “good is to be done and evil avoided”.  Further, secondary precepts make more difference in peoples’ lives today than primary precepts.

    Examples of mystical experiences should be considered valid religious experiences. Discuss [40]

    In his “Varieties of Religious Experience” William James argued that examples of mystical experiences which have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic justify their recipient’s belief in God and deserve to be taken seriously by others, as potentially valid religious experiences. Yet, atheists like Richard Dawkins remain unconvinced, arguing that “exceptional claims demand exceptional evidence” and dismissing all “mystical experiences” as fakes or mistakes. Overall, Dawkins’ argument arises from prejudice and an unscientifically closed mind, so James’ argument is more persuasive.

    Firstly, Dawkins rejects the claim of any “mystical experience” to be considered a valid religious experience.  Like David Hume in his analysis “Of Miracles”, Dawkins reasons that it is always more probable that the experience was the result of psychological and/or physiological processes than that the experience was of God.  Dawkins’ argument has intuitive appeal and has been supported by other atheists, including Susan Blackmore, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, yet it does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Yes, scientists can “explain away” individual experiences… saying that St Augustine undergoing a moral crisis and St Bernadette an attention-seeker… but each explanation is different, while what the mystics claim to have experienced is one and the same. Is it more likely that so many different people in different circumstances are all deluded from multiple different improbable causes, or that what so many people have reported to have experienced in diverse ways is real?  As James concluded, “higher” mystical experiences “offer us HYPOTHESES, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset.[1]” It is fair to say that Dawkins chooses to ignore examples of mystical experiences which, if taken seriously and properly investigated, might yield a better insight into reality than the narrow scientific materialism that Dawkins seems wedded to.  In “The Existence of God” Richard Swinburne has shown how it is slightly more probable that God exists than not and that – given that prior probability and the principles of credulity and testimony – the existence of so many religious experiences (though defined more broadly than according to James’ four marks) tips the balance decisively in favour of God’s existence. Dawkins’ argument that mystical experiences are always more probably fakes or mistakes than valid has thus been falsified.

    Secondly, scientists like Dawkins have sought to provide alternative explanations for mystical experiences to show that they are not valid religious experiences.  Yet, as James pointed out, such explanations cannot account for the positive and lasting change that such experiences bring about in their recipients’ lives. For example, it may be that St Paul’s experiences were the result of epileptic seizures, but this medical explanation can’t account for the spiritual effect of the experiences on Paul and through him, on the world. Many people have had epileptic seizures, but only one wrote most of the New Testament. Further, despite his scepticism about their causes, Dawkins is fascinated by spiritual experiences and volunteered to be a research subject, wearing Michael Persinger’s “God helmet” to discover what so many religious people have felt.  Afterwards, he said that he was “very disappointed” by the experience, finding that the brain stimulation did not in fact create the sensation that mystics report.  This suggests that one of the most common scientific means of “explaining away” mystical experiences is not credible. In addition, assuming that some experiences are valid, God must appear to people in some way; if not through visions or voices, then through some ineffable, transient sensation as reported by mystics.  Yet, whatever sensation God chooses is bound to be affected by disorders, so that if a person has an ineffable sensation, it is likely to be diagnosed in terms of an associated disorder.  Also, even if scientists can identify how somebody might have an unusual sensation, this does not account for why they had the sensation… God could be working through physiological processes.  All of this shows that Dawkins is wrong and that examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.

    On the other hand, claimed “mystical experiences” are very diverse and vary in credibility. It is difficult to define mystical experiences so that only those that are credible are included when claiming that they should be considered valid religious experiences. For example, James argued that “higher” mystical experiences, such as should be considered as valid religious experiences, have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic. Yet, it is not clear that even the examples James appeals to have all four marks.  James uses St Teresa of Avila’s descriptions of mystical experiences to develop his argument, yet were these experiences really either passive or transient… and given the number of words she used to describe them, were they ineffable either?  Further, other scholars have defined mystical experiences differently, either more narrowly as in the definitions of Otto and Stace, or more broadly, as in the definitions of Swinburne and the Alister Hardy Centre.  The lack of a single, clear definition for mystical experiences and the inclusion of less credible experiences within some of these definitions surely undermines the case for considering them valid religious experiences.  Nevertheless, perhaps the lack of a clear definition is to be expected if mystical experiences are valid religious experiences. As James points out, language is inadequate when it comes to describing God so that scholars have sometimes resorted to the apophatic way or analogy and the use of qualifiers. Why would we expect people to be able to describe mystical experiences of God any more clearly? 

    In conclusion, examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.  While some claimed mystical experiences lack credibility and are probably not valid religious experiences, others deserve serious consideration and scientific investigation that does not begin from a fixed starting point of naïve materialism.


    [1] https://csrs.nd.edu/assets/59930/williams_1902.pdf page 325