faith

The Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. Discuss [40]

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Protestant Christians have faith “Sola Scriptura”, seeing Christian Ethics as Theonomous and based only on God’s commands… usually as found in Scripture, which is understood to be the Words of God and Inerrant. Despite this, relatively few Protestants would accept that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide because there are some subjects on which the Bible says nothing (such as Abortion, IVF, Assisted Dying) and because even where the Bible does speak, what is said is in need of interpretation. As a result, the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide.

Firstly, even Karl Barth rejected the claim that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. Barth criticised both Natural Theology and Natural Law, the Roman Catholic claim that we can discover most of what is right and wrong using reason, because he believed that this has been corrupted by the Fall. Drawing on the writings of St Paul and St Augustine, Barth argued that we are saved by grace and faith and not because of anything we have done (Ephesians 2:8), suggesting that we can’t discover God’s existence or nature using reason and neither can we discover right and wrong, let alone use this knowledge to earn our own salvation by works (the Pelagian heresy). For Barth, knowledge of God and what is good must be revealed and this revelation is for most people through Scripture. Yet Barth also criticised the view that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. This is because Scripture is not itself God’s revelation, but rather witness to God’s revelation through Jesus and the Prophets. Being only a record of what was revealed, rather than revelation, it should be seen as a human creation and subject to some errors and omissions, however minor. For Barth, as for Bonhoeffer, Christians should reflect on their reading of Scripture as a whole and on the example of Jesus when making moral decisions autonomously and personally, rather than trying to follow lines of the Bible individually on face value. Today, scholars such as NT Wright and Peter Enns agree with Barth’s approach to Biblical Ethics. For NT Wright, the narrative or story of the Bible is true and inerrant, but the idea that isolated parts can be taken literally out of context and without proper interpretation is mistaken. Similarly, Enns points out that the Bible is a human creation which reflects its cultural contexts and authors’ perspectives. Surely, God speaks through scripture, but it should not be understood as a transcript of God’s words, let alone as a comprehensive guide to God’s thinking on moral issues. Biblical Criticism supports the approach to Scripture taken by Barth, Wright and Enns. Textual analysis has shown that the Bible was written by multiple authors and repeatedly redacted, as well as that the historical, political and theological concerns of the authors and redactors are reflected in the text. Given this, as well as the existence of multiple translations and editions of the Bible, it is hard to see that it is intellectually credible to argue that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide.

In addition, the Roman Catholic Church, while upholding the principle of Biblical Inerrancy, dismisses the idea that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. For Roman Catholics, Scripture is one source of moral authority among others, including Tradition and Reason (Natural Law). As Aquinas pointed out, Scripture needs to be read as a whole and through “the lens of doctrine” or it can seem to give guidance that contradicts reason and/or Christian tradition. For example, in Romans 2:6 the Bible says “God will repay each one according to his deeds.” and of course Matthew 25 says much the same thing through the Parable of the Sheep and Goats, while the Bible also says that people are saved by Grace and Faith and not because of anything they have done in Ephesians 2:8-9. This seems contradictory and could lead an individual Protestant who reads the Bible to believe that they are saved because of good works and perhaps that anybody who does good works will be saved, while this contradicts Christian tradition which is clearly Sola Gratia and exclusivist. Roman Catholics point out that following Church Teachings, which are informed by Tradition and Reason as well as Scripture, which itself is interpreted “through the lens of doctrine” and as a whole rather than in isolated parts, guards against being led into error in this way. Of course, evangelical Protestants will reject this argument that Christian Ethics should be Heteronomous, reasoning that the Bible itself says that the Holy Spirit will guide those who God has saved to the truth, so they do not misunderstand God’s will when reading Scripture. “But when he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will guide you into all the truth.” John 16:13 Yet Roman Catholics would reject this and say that this is a very particular interpretation of this passage and does not explain how faithful Christians can read Scripture and end up with multiple interpretations of what it says. If having the “right interpretation” depends on having been saved and having “wrong interpretations” is symptomatic of having not received God’s Grace and Spirit, then when multiple interpretations exist amongst God’s fearing and good people – as is evidenced by the multiplicity of Protestant denominations for example – how is anybody to know what the “right interpretation” and God’s law is? The result of arguing that Scripture is a comprehensive moral guide is to leave Christian Ethics up to the consciences of individuals, giving them license to believe that anything that they feel led to believe is what God commands. This is not a practical approach to Christian Ethics. The Yorkshire Ripper Peter Sutcliffe believed that he was led by God to murder women, quoting his readings of scripture to justify his heinous crimes… can anybody really say that he should have listened to his conscience and that he was right to do so when it led him to break God’s sixth Commandment (Exodus 20:13) as well as the whole of Christian tradition and reason? While Acts 5:29 does say “we must obey God rather than human beings”, suggesting that doing what is right may well break social norms and even religious teachings, the argument that Christian Ethics consists in following one’s personal “conscience” wherever it leads, provided that these leadings were inspired by one’s reading of the Bible in some way (however idiosyncratic or irrational), is difficult to defend. This suggests that the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide.

On the other hand, the Bible itself suggests that it is a comprehensive moral guide – at least in parts – so Protestants who have faith Sola Scriptura and uphold Biblical Inerrancy may feel bound to accept that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. St Paul wrote that “all scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching… so that the servant of God may be thoroughly equipped for every good work…” 2 Timothy 3:16-17; this implies that the Bible is a complete moral handbook for Christians. On the other hand, Roman Catholics have pointed out that this quotation is taken out of context, ignoring the preceding sentence “continue in what you have learned and have become convinced of, because you know those from whom you learned it” 2 Timothy 3:14, which suggests that there are sources of authority besides the Bible. Further, there are other passages in the Bible which suggest that there are moral authorities outside of Scripture. Romans 13:1 affirms “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.” suggesting that Christians should obey those who have power and worldly authority as well as the “plain word of Scripture”. This is confirmed by Hebrews 13:17. Further, the Bible also says that ignorant people can misinterpret Scripture, suggesting that Luther was wrong to suggest that “A simple layman armed with Scripture is to be believed above a pope or a cardinal without it.” St Peter wrote of St Paul’s letters – amongst which 2 Timothy purports to be – that “His letters contain some things that are hard to understand, which ignorant and unstable people distort, as they do the other Scriptures, to their own destruction.” 2 Peter 3:16, suggesting that it is possible for people to be misled by the word of Scripture and that additional education may be necessary to understand its true meaning. In this way, the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on the authority of Scripture – that it must be acknowledged as “teaching solidly, faithfully and without error that truth which God wanted put into sacred writings for the sake of salvation.” Dei Verbum but that the Church holds the authority to interpret it, to discover and communicate that truth to ordinary people, handed down from St Peter who received it from Jesus (Matthew 18:18) – is more persuasive than the minority Protestant view that Scripture is a comprehensive moral guide. Further, using the inerrancy of the Bible to justify having faith in the inerrancy and completeness of the Bible is a circular argument which as such is unconvincing. Nevertheless, Evangelical Protestants such as RC Sproul, JI Packer and more recently Wayne Grudem have argued that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide. They stress Biblical Inerrancy, arguing that faith in God means faith in God’s word in scripture. If one doubts the Bible and its teaching in any part, it is the same as doubting God’s authority and not consistent with being a Christian. St Augustine made this point, as did Harold Lindsell in “The Battle for the Bible”, published in 1978, the same year that many Protestant leaders signed up to the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy. Yet, despite signing the Chicago Statement on inerrancy, even Evangelical scholars like Wayne Grudem stop short of claiming that the Bible is a comprehensive moral guide today, because the Bible does not address many contemporary moral issues. He wrote “the Bible always tells the truth, and it always tells the truth concerning everything that it talks about.” This suggests that there may be things that the Bible does not talk about, about which it does not tell the truth, and so that the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide.

In conclusion, the Bible is not a comprehensive moral guide. This is accepted by Protestant authorities such as Karl Barth as well as by the Roman Catholic Church and is supported by reason, evidence and even some parts of the Bible itself. Even those few evangelical protestant scholars who seem to support this claim stop short of actually endorsing the idea that the Bible is a comprehensive or complete guide when it comes to modern moral issues.

“The word conscience is best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.” Discuss (40)

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We use the word “conscience” every day, but rarely stop to think about what it really means.  In broad terms, it usually refers to our inner moral compass, yet it can also refer to the voice of God within us, reason, how we apply our moral principles, our moral framework or even the internalised voices of our parents within our subconscious mind. Because of this, and because the arguments of those who have attempted to define the conscience as a specific thing are not persuasive, it is best to understand conscience as an umbrella term for various factors in moral decision-making.

Firstly, in the Bible various different words are used to refer to and sometimes translated as conscience.  In the Old Testament, the Hebrew word “lev” for heart suggests that there is an inner moral guide.  For example, “David’s heart condemned him after he had numbered the people. So David said to the LORD “I have sinned greatly in what I have done…” 2 Samuel 24:10 It was not until the rabbinic period that the Hebrew word matzpun referred to conscience. Etymologically it means “hidden north”, giving the suggestion of an inner moral compass. In the New Testament the Greek word syneídēsis means the capacity to apply general principles of moral judgment to particular cases.  The word is used frequently by St Paul, for example in Romans Chapter 2 “when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them.” After the 4th Century AD the Greek word Synderesis / Synteresis started to be used in commentaries on both Old and New Testaments. The word synderesis is by most scholars reckoned to be a corruption of the Greek word syneidêsis (συνείδησις).  On the other hand, also in the New Testament, St Paul speaks of those whose consciences have become “seared with a hot iron,” 1 Timothy 4:2 meaning they no longer feel guilt for sin. Conversely, a “good” or “clear” conscience is seen as one that is aligned with God’s will (1 Timothy 1:5). In 1 Peter 3:16, Peter encourages Christians to maintain a clear conscience, so that they may stand firm in their faith and defend it with integrity when challenged. These references suggest that conscience is a distinct faculty that all human beings have.  Given that the Bible uses different words for conscience and implies that it is God’s law, an inner moral guide or compass, the capacity to apply general principles to specific cases, our moral character and a faculty which can be corrupted, it seems that the word conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

Secondly, following the Bible, different Christian scholars have used the word conscience to refer to different things. For example, Aquinas uses three different words to distinguish between three things people usually use the word conscience for; Ratio, Synderesis and Conscientia.  For Aquinas, the God-given and rational part of conscience is called RATIO, it commands us to pursue good and avoid evil and cannot be wrong. For Kant, this is reason itself, issuing us with Categorical Imperatives which we must choose to follow.  For St Augustine, Butler and Newman this is conscience as the “voice of God” speaking through our minds and calling us to do what is right, which they admit is not always the same as what is rational. For Aquinas also, the conscience is not a synonym for reason but also refers to a specific habit of reason that tries to work out what good and evil consist in. This practical part of reason (what Aristotle called Phronesis) is known as SYNDERESIS and it requires formation, moving from offering only the most general guidance towards being more and more specific.  While it is a duty to follow the guidance of synderesis, which is after all part of Ratio which cannot be wrong, because its guidance may be too general to be useful it might mislead us, such as leading us to pursue an apparent good and not a real good. In addition, for Aquinas, another part of conscience is CONSCIENTIA, the act of applying synderesis-guidance to specific situations.  This is what Fletcher refers to as conscience, defining it as a verb not a noun.  This shows that scholars use the word conscience to refer to the faculty of reason, the voice of God, the habit of practical reason and the act of applying moral rules to a specific situation… and that conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

Thirdly, psychologists have a variety of ideas about what the conscience consists in, that are independent of the Bible and based on scientific observations. While his methodology was criticised by Popper as pseudo-scientific, Freud saw conscience as part of the super-ego, part of the subconscious mind that represents internalised voices of our parents, societal norms, religious beliefs and moral ideals. Conscience is formed during early childhood, particularly through the oral, anal and phallic phases of psycho-sexual development, suggesting that while conscience is a specific part of the psyche, it is made up of the values of our parents or care-givers as influenced by repressed experiences in different ways, explaining why peoples’ consciences seem to guide them in different directions that are not always rational or consistent with prevailing social norms. Freud’s ideas influenced other psychologists, whose methodologies are more credible, again seeking to explain how consciences develop through childhood and differ between adults.  For Piaget, consciences develop from being heteronomous in early childhood to being autonomous during the teenage years, and developmental disorders therefore explain why some adults lack a moral conscience, why others have a strong sense of the conscience being like a moral compass pointing towards fixed rules and still others see it as a more flexible and situational process of decision-making.  Similarly, for Fromm conscience usually develops from being authoritarian into being more humanistic, but some people fail to develop leaving them with an authoritarian conscience into adulthood and conforming to rules imposed on them from outside without really engaging reason. This explains how totalitarian regimes sometimes succeed, and why there will always be those who oppose them on humanistic grounds.  Finally, Kohlberg built on the ideas of Piaget and Fromm to suggest that conscience continues to develop in adulthood for some, towards a post-conventional level which at Stage 6 involves the conscience being reason, applying universal moral rules. Kohlberg explains why some peoples’ consciences demand that they follow rational deontological ethics, while others suggest they should be more situational and relativistic in their decision-making while others still command them to conform with social norms. While Freud, Piaget, Fromm and Kohlberg suggest that there is a specific thing called the conscience, they stress how it develops and changes, giving guidance of different sorts.  They also have slightly different ideas of conscience from each other.  This also suggests that conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making.

In conclusion, the word conscience is not a single thing, but best understood as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making. From a Christian perspective, Friedrich Schleiermacher, a German theologian and philosopher, agreed with this, viewing conscience as an umbrella term that integrates various factors of moral self-awareness. From a social-scientific perspective Carol Gilligan (b.1936) in “A Different Voice” (1982) argued that conscience is an umbrella term that includes different moral orientations depending on one’s ethical approach (e.g., care ethics versus justice ethics). She suggested that the conscience is influenced by not just reasoning, but also empathy, relational dynamics, and the emotional ties that influence moral judgment.  Whether one is approaching conscience from a religious or non-religious perspective, seeing it as an umbrella term for various factors involved in moral decision making is the most credible approach.

Assess the claim that love (agape) is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics. [40]

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In John Chapter 13 Jesus taught his disciples “A new command I give you: Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another.  By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another.”  The Greek word translated “love” in this passage is agape, which refers to the non-preferential humanitarian love that Jesus showed to people rather than the erotic eros or the friendly philos.  This is why some Christians regard agape-love as the only source of Christian ethics, because it was Jesus’ single new commandment and, of course, Jesus was God. Nevertheless, today few Christians agree with this, given that Roman Catholics follow heteronomous ethics and most Protestants a broader Divine Command ethic based on the whole Bible.  It follows that agape is not sufficient as the only source of Christian ethics.

Firstly, while John 13 does state that agape-love is the one commandment by which Christians will be known as Jesus’ disciples, Jesus said this in context.  In Jeremiah 31:33 God promised that “This is the covenant I will make with the people of Israel after that time,” declares the LORD. “I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts. I will be their God, and they will be my people.” This suggests that Jesus was referring to the new covenant when he gave the commandment of agape-love, and meaning that Christians would follow all God’s law automatically in both letter and spirit, rather than that they would abandon the rest of the commandments and do whatever they felt was loving instead.  This interpretation is consistent with Matthew 5:18 “For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished…” and with the rest of Jesus ethical teaching, which is more demanding than the Law of Moses and not less.  For example, in Matthew 5 teaches that Jesus equated anger with murder and lustful looks with adultery.  While Jesus was demanding that Christians should act with agape – treating others as they would wish to be treated and not only following the letter of the law – there is no sense that agape is an alternative source of ethics to the rest of God’s commandments.   The point is that a person acting with agape would neither be angry with somebody nor murder them, neither look lustfully at a woman nor commit adultery with her.  In this way it would be wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics.

Secondly, for Roman Catholics seeing agape-love as a sufficient basis for Christian Ethics ignores the importance of a well-formed conscience as well as of Scripture, Tradition and Reason (Natural Law) in shaping Christian teaching. Following St Thomas Aquinas’ reasoning, the Catechism affirms that the primary source of Christian ethics is the conscience.  When we face a difficult choice, it is a moral duty to follow conscience.  Our conscientia is that part of our practical reason that applies the general principles of Christian Ethics that we know through synderesis (principles which are consistent with Scripture, Tradition and Natural Law) to the specific situation at hand.  Nevertheless, because consciences can err, leading us to pursue apparent and not real goods, and because synderesis is a habit that needs to be developed, we must take care that consciences are properly formed through a Catholic education.  Church teachings, which underpin Catholic education, provide a short-cut to the decisions that a well-formed conscience would make and when the conscience diverges from Catholic teachings it is a good indication that the conscience is erring.  Pope Pius XII rejected situation ethics in 1952, even before its more agapeistic versions were developed by Joseph Fletcher and JAT Robinson, because while it is consistent with the Roman Catholic understanding of Christian ethics in encouraging Christians to act in conscience, because it ignores the need to form consciences or ensure that their decisions are consistent with Scripture, Tradition and Reason, it leaves individuals vulnerable and without proper moral guidance when they face difficult situations. Fletcher’s claim that there should be no absolutes in Christian ethics, no always and no nevers, conflicts with the Bible’s long list of prescriptive commandments and suggests that agape is instead of the law rather than a fulfilment of it, as Jesus taught.  It is also difficult to define agape-love.  For example, Immanuel Kant argued that human beings are “pathologically loving” and that an action motivated by this love always treat human beings as ends in themselves and never as mere means.  By contrast, Fletcher defends what he calls the agapeic calculus, the greatest amount of neighbour-welfare for the largest number of neighbours possible, making agapeistic ethics seem much like utilitarianism.  While by Kant’s definition, agape could never justify involuntary abortion, suicide or adultery… but Fletcher freely discusses situations in which these would, he implies, be the most loving course of action. Because of this central confusion, it is difficult for people not to confuse a genuinely agapeistic motivation with a more preferential or even selfish motivation. All this shows that it is wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethics.

On the other hand, it is true that Jesus sometimes seemed to break the laws of Moses situationally, for the benefit of people. According to Mark’s Gospel, He healed on the Sabbath and allowed his disciples to pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, neither of which in life-threatening situations. It seems that Jesus was maximising peoples’ welfare and putting this ahead of obedience to the law, as Fletcher suggested.  Nevertheless, the laws concerning the Sabbath were, Jesus reasoned, there to serve man and therefore could and should be broken when they harm peoples’ welfare.  The same might not be true of other laws, such as the prohibition on murder in Exodus 20:13.  In Genesis 4 God says that Abel’s blood cries out to him from the ground and in Genesis 9 God demands an accounting for any human blood that is shed.  This might suggest that the law against murder is not only to serve humans, but also to serve God because God has an interest in human blood.  As St Paul confirms in 1 Corinthians 6:19-20 “Do you not know that your bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore honour God with your bodies.” Which implies that human life is sacred and owned by God, so murder offends against God and not only human beings.  If this is true, then it would be impossible to act out of agape-love and kill a human being, even in situations as extreme as outlined by Fletcher, because agape puts love of God first and ahead of love of neighbour, according to Mark 12:28-32. Kant would be right that agape always treats humanity as an end and never as a means to an end, even of maximising human welfare. This suggests that agape-love is not sufficient as a source of Christian ethics, unless one specifies that it includes love of God as well as and ahead of love of neighbour, which would bring following all of God’s commandments into the scope of agape, rather than accepting God’s laws only selectively. This interpretation would be consistent with a more mainstream Protestant Ethic, which aims to follow all those Divine Commands in spirit at least. 

In conclusion, it is wrong to say that agape is sufficient as the only source of Christian Ethic unless one is very specific in defining agape, stipulating that it includes love of God as well as and ahead of love of neighbour, so leads to a broader biblical ethic which always upholds the sanctity of human life.  Certainly, it is wrong to say that situation ethics is the only or even an acceptable Christian Ethic.

The five primary precepts are the most important part of natural law. Discuss [40]

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St Thomas Aquinas explained his theory of natural law, which shares many characteristics with other versions of natural law, in Summa 2i. 94.2.  He explained how natural laws are discoverable through RATIO, the human intellect, which is made up of SPECULATIVE REASON and PRACTICAL REASON.  Speculative reason reveals abstract notions and principles, such as “good is that which all things seek after,” then practical reason applies these to real life, developing moral precepts for us to follow.  For example, “this is the first precept of [natural] law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” Aquinas goes on to explain how “all other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.” He elaborated on the precepts of natural law, listing and explaining primary and secondary precepts, explaining how “Since… good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.” Primary precepts are thus established as “objects of pursuit” or prescriptions and secondary precepts as “objects of avoidance” or prohibitions.  For examples, “whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law…” meaning that the preservation of human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept. Aquinas also lists as primary precepts sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God and shunning ignorance as well as living in society, avoiding offending those amongst whom one must live.  Overall, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law.

    Firstly, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law because they are derived from the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided”, and different scholars have derived different lists of primary precepts, which have gone on to produce different lists of secondary precepts and disagreements in how natural law guides people in practical situations. Aquinas discussed whether or not his list of primary precepts was infallible in Summa 2i. 94. 2 and concluded that the first precept “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided” is infallible, because it is so closely related to the Primary Principle of speculative reason “good is that which all things seek after” and because speculative reason cannot be wrong, its objects being necessary truths.  Nevertheless, the primary precepts of the preservation of human life, sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, knowing the truth about God, shunning ignorance and living in society are known through synderesis, which must develop its understanding of these precepts as it is formed.  While nothing the synderesis suggests can be wrong, the list of primary precepts it provides might be incomplete, which explains why some societies seem unaware of some basic human goods.  Aquinas explains how it is possible to be unaware that living in society and avoiding offending neighbours is a primary precept, “thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).”  This would explain why later versions of natural law have listed the primary precepts differently, and particularly why some have added to Aquinas’ five.  For example, John Finnis lists seven basic human goods, including play and aesthetic experience.  This could be because Finnis’ synderesis has developed further than Aquinas’ did, coming to recognise the essential importance of fun and beauty to human flourishing in a way that Aquinas never did.  It follows that the fact that the list of five primary precepts provided by Aquinas, and indeed other lists in other versions of Natural Law, differ and might be incomplete suggests that they cannot be the most important part of natural law.

    Secondly, the primary precepts are general injunctions and need to be translated into secondary precepts in order to provide useful moral guidance. Whereas the primary precepts are positive, secondary precepts are negative and tell people what they must not do.  For example, preserve human life is a primary precept and “do not murder” is a secondary precept.  Yet there are often multiple secondary precepts derived from each primary precept.  For example, the primary precept of living in society would lead to a huge number of secondary prohibitions, ranging from do not steal to do not lie to do not be jealous or aggressive… It follows that the majority of moral rules that people live by in practice are secondary and not primary precepts, suggesting that the secondary precepts are more important than the primary precepts.  Of course, secondary precepts are all derived from the primary precepts, so could not exist without the primary precepts and would differ if the primary precepts differed.  This might suggest that the primary precepts are more important than the secondary precepts, and yet for most people their moral awareness begins with the conscientia speaking against certain actions in a negative way, such as by warning people not to cheat or deceive.  Although it is true that the conscientia does this because it is seeking to apply the primary precepts to specific situations, in practice people are usually aware of the secondary precepts before or even without being aware of the primary precepts, which suggests that in fact the secondary precepts are more important.

    On the other hand, Proportionalists like Bernard Hoose would argue that the primary precepts of Natural Law are more important than the secondary precepts because there are sometimes proportional justifications for breaking secondary precepts, but never for breaking primary precepts.  For example, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to the secondary precept, don’t run inside… because running causes accidents and people might get hurt… but in the case of an explosion it might be proportionally justified to run, risking accidents, when this is the only way to save lives. Similarly, the primary precept of preserving human life might lead to a secondary prohibition against abortion, but in the case of an ectopic pregnancy where inaction would lead to the death of both mother and child, it might be proportionally justified to abort in order to preserve the maximum number of human lives. Hoose points out that even Aquinas uses proportional reasoning to justify war, capital punishment and even the toleration of prostitution… so surely this suggests that primary precepts are more important than secondary precepts, given that secondary precepts can be broken in the pursuit of good, but not primary precepts.  Nevertheless, while Hoose is right that proportional reasoning in the writing of Aquinas and later scholars suggests that secondary precepts are less important than primary precepts, proportionalism has been condemned by the Roman Catholic Church, the main adopter of Natural Law.  The Church sees proportionalism as a slippery slope towards situation ethics, utilitarianism and antinomianism in ethics. Instead, the Church has chosen to adopt a Heteronomous Ethic, with the Magisterium using Natural Law alongside Scripture and Tradition to develop Church Teachings which are Secondary Precepts.  These are then used as the basis for encyclicals, Catholic instruction and advice as well as for formation. It follows that for ordinary Roman Catholics secondary precepts are more important than Primary Precepts, because they are encouraged to follow Church Teaching rather than to try to develop it!  While the Church accepts Aquinas’ teaching about conscience, it emphasises the importance of formation so that the Synderesis and Conscientia guide Catholics to follow Church teaching in all matters, rather than really to think for themselves.  This suggests that in practice secondary precepts are in fact more important than primary principles, even though this might not be true to Aquinas’ intention.

    In conclusion, the five primary precepts are not the most important part of natural law. As has been established, the list of five primary precepts might be incomplete and is certainly disputed, while also depending on the key precept “good is to be done and evil avoided”.  Further, secondary precepts make more difference in peoples’ lives today than primary precepts.

    Examples of mystical experiences should be considered valid religious experiences. Discuss [40]

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    In his “Varieties of Religious Experience” William James argued that examples of mystical experiences which have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic justify their recipient’s belief in God and deserve to be taken seriously by others, as potentially valid religious experiences. Yet, atheists like Richard Dawkins remain unconvinced, arguing that “exceptional claims demand exceptional evidence” and dismissing all “mystical experiences” as fakes or mistakes. Overall, Dawkins’ argument arises from prejudice and an unscientifically closed mind, so James’ argument is more persuasive.

    Firstly, Dawkins rejects the claim of any “mystical experience” to be considered a valid religious experience.  Like David Hume in his analysis “Of Miracles”, Dawkins reasons that it is always more probable that the experience was the result of psychological and/or physiological processes than that the experience was of God.  Dawkins’ argument has intuitive appeal and has been supported by other atheists, including Susan Blackmore, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, yet it does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Yes, scientists can “explain away” individual experiences… saying that St Augustine undergoing a moral crisis and St Bernadette an attention-seeker… but each explanation is different, while what the mystics claim to have experienced is one and the same. Is it more likely that so many different people in different circumstances are all deluded from multiple different improbable causes, or that what so many people have reported to have experienced in diverse ways is real?  As James concluded, “higher” mystical experiences “offer us HYPOTHESES, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset.[1]” It is fair to say that Dawkins chooses to ignore examples of mystical experiences which, if taken seriously and properly investigated, might yield a better insight into reality than the narrow scientific materialism that Dawkins seems wedded to.  In “The Existence of God” Richard Swinburne has shown how it is slightly more probable that God exists than not and that – given that prior probability and the principles of credulity and testimony – the existence of so many religious experiences (though defined more broadly than according to James’ four marks) tips the balance decisively in favour of God’s existence. Dawkins’ argument that mystical experiences are always more probably fakes or mistakes than valid has thus been falsified.

    Secondly, scientists like Dawkins have sought to provide alternative explanations for mystical experiences to show that they are not valid religious experiences.  Yet, as James pointed out, such explanations cannot account for the positive and lasting change that such experiences bring about in their recipients’ lives. For example, it may be that St Paul’s experiences were the result of epileptic seizures, but this medical explanation can’t account for the spiritual effect of the experiences on Paul and through him, on the world. Many people have had epileptic seizures, but only one wrote most of the New Testament. Further, despite his scepticism about their causes, Dawkins is fascinated by spiritual experiences and volunteered to be a research subject, wearing Michael Persinger’s “God helmet” to discover what so many religious people have felt.  Afterwards, he said that he was “very disappointed” by the experience, finding that the brain stimulation did not in fact create the sensation that mystics report.  This suggests that one of the most common scientific means of “explaining away” mystical experiences is not credible. In addition, assuming that some experiences are valid, God must appear to people in some way; if not through visions or voices, then through some ineffable, transient sensation as reported by mystics.  Yet, whatever sensation God chooses is bound to be affected by disorders, so that if a person has an ineffable sensation, it is likely to be diagnosed in terms of an associated disorder.  Also, even if scientists can identify how somebody might have an unusual sensation, this does not account for why they had the sensation… God could be working through physiological processes.  All of this shows that Dawkins is wrong and that examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.

    On the other hand, claimed “mystical experiences” are very diverse and vary in credibility. It is difficult to define mystical experiences so that only those that are credible are included when claiming that they should be considered valid religious experiences. For example, James argued that “higher” mystical experiences, such as should be considered as valid religious experiences, have the four marks of being passive, transient, ineffable and noetic. Yet, it is not clear that even the examples James appeals to have all four marks.  James uses St Teresa of Avila’s descriptions of mystical experiences to develop his argument, yet were these experiences really either passive or transient… and given the number of words she used to describe them, were they ineffable either?  Further, other scholars have defined mystical experiences differently, either more narrowly as in the definitions of Otto and Stace, or more broadly, as in the definitions of Swinburne and the Alister Hardy Centre.  The lack of a single, clear definition for mystical experiences and the inclusion of less credible experiences within some of these definitions surely undermines the case for considering them valid religious experiences.  Nevertheless, perhaps the lack of a clear definition is to be expected if mystical experiences are valid religious experiences. As James points out, language is inadequate when it comes to describing God so that scholars have sometimes resorted to the apophatic way or analogy and the use of qualifiers. Why would we expect people to be able to describe mystical experiences of God any more clearly? 

    In conclusion, examples of mystical experiences should be considered as potentially valid religious experiences.  While some claimed mystical experiences lack credibility and are probably not valid religious experiences, others deserve serious consideration and scientific investigation that does not begin from a fixed starting point of naïve materialism.

    [1] https://csrs.nd.edu/assets/59930/williams_1902.pdf page 325